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This thesis is a study of radio frequency spe'^ruia pSi^age-
ment as practiced by agencies and departments of the Federai
Government. After a brief introduction to the international
agency involved in radio frequency spectrum management, the
author concentrates on Federal agencies engaged in frequency
management. These agencies include the National Telecommunica-
tions & Information Administration (NTIA) , the Interdepartment
Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) , and the Department of Defense
(DoD) . Based on an analysis of Department of Defense fre-
quency assignment procedures, recommendations are given con-
cerning decentralizing military frequency assignment by
delegating broader authority to unified commanders . This
proposal includes a recommendation to colocate the individual
Service frequency management offices at the Washington level.
This would result in reduced travel costs, lower manpower
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis presents a study of the structure of radio
frequency spectrum management in the United States from a
military perspective. The purpose of this study is to eval-
uate the effectiveness of the current structure with a view
toward recommending improvements. The management of the spec-
trum is divided into three major levels: 1) the International
Level, 2) the National Level: Non-Military, and, 3) the Na-
tional Level: Military. Figure 1 shows an overview of these
three levels. In this figure the interactions between the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) , the Department
of State, the U.S. Military Communications-Electronics Board
(USMCEB) , and the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) are indicated. These lines do not indi-
cate control within the hierarchy, but rather the flow of
recommendations to and from the international forum for the
purpose of radio frequency spectrum management (this term
will be defined later) . The lines between the NTIA-MCEB and
the mdlitary departments are indicative of a control function
in spectrum management.
The radio frequency spectrum is a man-made natural re-
source. It is man-made in the sense that the extent of the
usable spectrum is limited only by man's ability to techo-
logically employ radio frequencies. Otherwise it has the
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spectrum is finite and is not exhausted through use nor does
it become worn out. As with other natural resources, care-
less use can pollute it and prevent the extracting of maximum
benefit from the spectrum. The radio frequency spectrum ranges
from ten kilohertz (10,000 hertz) to three terahertz
2(3,000,000,000 hertz). Of this broad expanse of radio fre-
quencies only about forty gigahertz (40,000,000 hertz) is
allocated for radio usage by international agreement.
The demand for the use of the radio frequency spectrum
has grown steadily since 19 35. The incentive for this growth
in the number of spectrum users and, consequently, the number
of separate frequencies in use can be linked to the growth in
per capita income, the changes in taste, and the levels in
population. Like other natural resources the demand for spec-
trum has produced an increase in the available supply of spec-
trum in two ways: 1) at the extensive margin and 2) at the
intensive margin. First, the technology to operate at higher
(newer) frequencies has expanded the quantity of spectrum; an
increase in supply at the extensive margin. Second, technology
has permitted closer channel spacing, e.g., the utilization
of more channels per frequency band. This has been done
through the development of technologically improved transmit-
ters, receivers, antennae, etc. These technological improve-
ments facilitate closer channel spacing because of narrower
frequency tolerances. This is an increase in the supply of
spectrum at the intensive margin.

The supply of spectrum is, therefore, largely determined
by technology, but management and economics also play impor-
tant roles in determining the supply of spectrum.
First, technology may increase the supply of spectrum,
but management of the spectrum improves its use in time, space,
and frequency. Spectrum management is concerned with the prob-
lem of the spectral dimensions of time, space, and frequency.
Signals transmitted on a specific frequency occupy all three
spatial dimensions. The degree to which the physical space
through which the signals pass is in fact occupied depends
upon the radiated power. Extreme power will so saturate
physical space so as to prevent any other signal from being
intelligibly received within it.
To illustrate, two spectrum users may simultaneously trans-
mit on the identical frequency if sufficiently geographically
separated. Because of their geographic separation, they oc-
cupy different spectrum in the spatial sense. If, however,
they are not geographically separated and transmit on the same
frequency and with the same power, but at different moments
in time, they occupy different spectrum in a temporal sense.
However, if they transmit with the same power at the same
time and are not geographically separated, they occupy the
same spectrum.
Second, economics plays an important role in determining
the usable supply of spectrum. The cost of the technology
required to utilize higher frequencies or to utilize more
closely spaced frequencies may limit the economic usability
10

of the supply of spectrum. Thus, the high cost of technology
to utilize higher frequencies effectively limits the spectrum
supply available for apportionment among users.
In essence, technology provides the physical supply of
spectrum, management concerns itself with the apportionment
of that supply, and economics measures the economic usability
of the supply of spectrum.
Radio frequency spectrum management concerns itself with
the control of the spectrum resource. Radio frequency spec-
trum management involves the managerial activities of:
1) formulating plans for the use of the spectrum and
executing controls over users of the spectrum,
2) structuring tasks for management of the spectrum
and making decisions about managing the spectrum,
3) communicating information and policy about decisions
concerning frequency management,
4) dealing with conflicts over how the spectrum is to
be used and by whom,
5) maintaing stability in spectrum management practices,
6) controlling change activities in spectrum management,
and,
7) apportioning resources among competing needs.
Two important aspects of resource apportionment are assign-
ment and allocation. Allocation may be thought of in two ways.
First, allocation may be viewed as the designation of a band
of frequencies to a specific telecommunications service such
as maritime mobile, fixed broadcasting, aeronautical navigation,
11

amateur, etc. This first view of allocation implies the exis-
tence of no specific spectrum user or constraint of particular
frequencies to a particular geographic area. Second, alloca-
tion may be viewed as the designation of a band of frequencies
and a specific service application to a given user or particu-
lar geographic area. In this thesis allocation has the latter
meaning. /
On the other hand, assignment is defined as the designa-
tion of a specific frequency within an allocation for a spe-
cific user of communications electronics equipment. Assignment
implies some property rights to the user of that frequency to
the mutual exclusion of other users.
As stated, there is a distinction between assignment and
allocation although some sources use the terms interchangeably.
A further distinction between assignment and allocation is
that allocations are made at the international level while
assignments are made by individual nations. Assignments are
designed to be made in accordance with a national allocation
plan which is a subset of the international allocation plan.
Radio frequency spectrum management involves the allocation
and assignment of radio frequncies . The term management,
used in this sense, is the attempt to control the utilization
of the spectrum in order to obtain the greatest benefit for
the greatest number of people, i
In essence, the real task of radio frequency spectrum
management is the assignment and allocation of radio fre-
quencies that minimimzes harmful interference while providing
12

telecommunications services at the lowest possible cost. A
major function of spectrum management is to alleviate the
growing congestion in the spectrum which leads to mutual inter-
ference. At the same time it must provide effective, rapid,
and reliable telecommunications services.
First, alternatives to the use of radio frequency can be
found, such as cable, transportation, optical fibers, etc.
Second, the extensive margin of the spectrum can be developed
by making more economically usable new frequencies available
for users. Currently this is being done by developing higher
frequencies for use. Third, the intensive margin can be devel-
oped by technologically improving transmitting equipment, using
directional antennae, and using more sensitive receivers to
4detect more closely spaced frequencies. And finally, as an
alternative to using more closely spaced channels , frequencies
which are normally used for long-range communications can be
used for short-range communications. Frequencies in the high
frequency band (3-30 megahertz) are normally used for long-
range communications. However, at certain times of the day
their propagation characteristics make long-range communica-
tion on these frequencies impractical. During this period of
the day these frequencies can be used successfully for short-
range communications. This is essentially a time-sharing
approach to expanding the supply of spectrum.
The author intends to discuss how the radio frequency spec-
trum is managed in the United States. The relationships with-
in the frequency management hierarchy will be explored with an
emphasis on its structure,
-j^

The thesis begins with this brief introduction and then
breaks the frequency management hierarchy into three basic
levels. Chapter Two explores the International Telecommunica-
tions Union (ITU) and its efforts to manage the spectrum
through mutual international cooperation without the force of
laws and regulations. Chapter Three looks into the United
States spectriim management hierarchy with emphasis on the
Federal Government's non-military spectrum management hierarchy
Chapter Four explores the military's spectrum management hier-




In this chapter the author will discuss the international
level organization, the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) . Figure 1 shows the position of the ITU in the fre-
quency management hierarchy. For the purposes of this thesis,
frequency management is defined as the control of the radio
frequency spectrum through the process of frequency allocation
and assignment, surveillance of equipment research & develop-
ment, and frequency usage records. This discussion will show
how the ITU has changed from a technically oriented associa-
tion to one whose decisions are colored by economics and poli-
tics. Also the matter of how politics and economics have come
to affect ITU allocations will be discussed.
A. ITU: TECHNOLOGY TO POLITICS
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) finds its
origins in two predecessor associations, the International
Telegraph Union (founded in 1865) and the International Radio-
telegraph Union (founded in 1906) . These two organizations
combined in 19 32 to form the International Telecommunication
Union. The ITU, like its predecessors, is a voluntary associ-
ation of independent countries formed to enhance the conduct
of international communications. It is voluntary in the
sense that nations could confine their communications within
their own national borders, but because of commericial and
political reasons, they choose not to do so. When communications
15

cross borders only international cooperation can assure that
they will reach their destination. Even adversaries find it
helpful to communicate, for example, the USA/USSR Hot Line.
The representatives of ITU member nations meet periodically
and draw up, by mutual agreement, rules, regulations, and rec-
ommendations for the conduct of telecommunication services.
The ITU consists of various technical committees and working
groups. Figure 2 shows the ITU organization structure.
George Codding, noted expert on the International Telecommuni-
cation Union has stated that the Consultative Committees of
the ITU are the organs in which the greatest amount of purely
technical work is accomplished and where there is usually free
exchange of ideas unhampered by political considerations.
These groups consist of telecommunication experts from both
the private and public sectors of the member nations.
The history of international communications organizations
has been divided into three periods: 1906-1957, Technological;
71957-1971, Transition to Political; and 1971-Present, Political.
The earliest period was marked by decisions concerning the
technical aspects of communications such as the adoption of
a standard design telegraph key, a standard telegraph code,
technical standards for transmitters to reduce frequency drift
and interference, licensing of operators, interface equipment
standards, and the allocation of frequencies to various services.
During the period 1957-1971, the World saw many former
colonies gaining their independence and emerging as a bloc




































a Congressional Research Service specialist in U.S. Foreign
Policy, suggests that the LDC ' S quickly found that they wielded
significant political power in the form of the New World Eco-
nomic Order which they were advocating at the United Nations.
The LDC'S, seeing themselves as the have-nots, began demanding
a greater share of the World's resources. They viewed the
technical domination of international telecommunications by
the industrial nations as a deliberate effort to continue
9dominating and exploiting them.
Woldman further suggests that since 19 71, the LDC'S have
emerged as a significant political power which has used the
United Nations as a venue for pushing their case for a greater
share of technology, resources, and capital. The LDC'S believe
that these items have been monopolized by the industrial na-
tions to the detriment of the LDC'S.
In the telcommunications arena, for example, the equa-
torial countries (Brazil, Columbia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia,
Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire) have claimed that they are the con-
trollers of a very important natural resource, the geostationary
orbital position for satellites. They claim that this orbit
is a physical fact arising from the nature of the Earth,
because its existence depends exclusively on its relation to
the Earth's gravity, ergot, it is not outer space (which has
been declared open to everyone by the 1967 Treaty on the Princi-
ples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies)
. The equatorial nations argue therefore, that the

segments of the synchronous geostationary orbit are a part
of the territory over which the equatorial countries exercise
sovereignty. Geostationary orbit positions are a scare resource
whose importance and, hence, value is increasing with the
growth in satellite communications technology. Therefore,
12these countries decided at Bogota in 1976 to defend their
sovereignty over this potentially lucrative natural resource.
In essence, they were demanding "rent" for the use of the geo-
13
stationary satellite parking places or demanding them for
their own use. The LDC'S knew they did not have the technology
to use them at the present time, but may have anticipated the
purchase of off-the-shelf technology to support a satellite
system of their own.
Another political issue is the flow of information between
the developed and lesser developed nations. The LDC'S are
concerned about the dominance of Western Nations over inter-
national news broadcasts. The LDC'S feel that they are, by
and large, neglected in news coverage. The news that is car-
ried tends to be unfavorable and unfair to them. They are
demanding more control over news generated and consumed within
14their countries. An example of this is the ordering of U.S.
newsmen out of Iran during the later stages of the U.S. Embassy
take-over in Tehran, Iran, in December, 1979. Some governments
feel that their ability to control their citizenry and promote
their own brand of chosen politics can be seriously jeopardized
if that government cannot in some way regulate the communication
system supplying foreign ideologies, i.e., the Voice of America
and the Radio Free Europe broadcasts.
19

Informed sources within the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration voiced concern that extensive
ideological rhetoric carried on at the General World Adminis-
trative Radio Conference 19 79 (GWARC 19 79) in Geneva could
successfully prevent any meaningful confrontations from occur-
ring, i.e., resolution of a U.S. proposal to increase satellite
allocations. In previous conferences the norm has been a
harmonious exchange of proposals based on the technical exper-
tise of the member nations. Recently, however, difficulty has
been encountered in drafting new international frequency alloca-
17
tions. Codding feels that this problem in drafting a new
allocation plan is one of the most pointed examples of national
interests placed ahead of effective technical control of tele-
18
communication services. No longer is it sufficient to demon-
strate the technical feasibility of a proposal, but now it must
be shown to be politically acceptable and economically advanta-
geous to the majority as a selling point for acceptance of the
proposal. This, however, can be a two-edged sword; the devel-
oped nations with heavy capital investment in certain portions
of the spectrum would be unwilling to reallocate frequencies
if their capital investment is rendered valueless in the pro-
cess. Since the establishment of the United Nations one-nation,
one-vote principle in the United Nation's affiliated bodies,
and the growing number of newly independent LDC ' S , highly
technical issues have sometimes been determined on the basis
19
of essentially political concerns. Recently this has become
I a significant problem. Consequently, LDC ' S with rudimentary
2Q

telecommunications systems and limited frequency requirements
often engage in bloc-voting. Woldman believes the odds favor
coalitions which sometimes form between LDC ' S and communist
20 . .
countries. These coalitions out number the developed nations
21
which had previously dominated international bodies. However,
as Woldman suggests, this shift in voting power from the devel-
oped natins to the LDC'S can be beneficial for both parties.
First, the developed nations may succeed in garnering the sup-
port of the LDC'S in achieving the goals of the developed
nations . This winning of support can be achieved by providing
technical assistance to the LDC'S. Second, the technical
assistance will open the way for an increase demand for the
telecommunications-electronics goods and services of the devel-
oped nations thus boosting their economy.
The politization of the International Telecommunication
Union's function is highlighted by noting that in the past
more weight has been given to the technical products of the
Consultative Committees and agreements were reached on this
technical basis. The ITU's response to the charge that there
is a conscious or unconscious swing away from technology based
decision-making by the ITU is best stated in their own words:
The ITU's decision process is manned by technicians
representing the specialists of the ITU. Presumably
the national technicians interrelate in their home
States before they engage the procedures and pro-
cess of the ITU. The impression exists that the ITU
in the totality of its operations is weighted more
in the direction of technical feasibility than in
the direction of a balancing of competing political
interests. The ITU, although certainly not immune
from the pressures of competing ideologies and the
differing interests of the new and old States, is
21

separated from the great concerns for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security that
reside in the U.N. 22
The author believes that the import of this statement is
that the ITU is trying to remain a non-political body that
manages the radio frequency spectrum based more on technologi-
cal considerations than on political-economic considerations.
Whether the agreements achieved in the ITU Consultative
Committees are implemented by the member nations via politi-
cally-based methods or technology-based methods, these techni-
cal agreements are more appropriately dubbed recommendations
rather than regulations because the ITU has no concrete authority
for enforcing these agreements. One major factor influencing
nations to abide by these agreements is the economic reality
of possessing a system which is incompatible with other sys-
tems designed and manufactured to ITU standards. For example,
a telecommunication network which is not manufactured or oper-
ated in . accordance with international technical standards
could not be integrated into a world-wide network and would be
23
of limited use. M. B. Williams suggests that, indeed, the
long life and huge investments involved in telecommunications
equipment, the differing practices and rates of development
among various nations indicate no other way of proceeding with
the definition of new techniques and of invoking the necessary
24
compromise.
The question of frequency allocation is a complex issue
which involves the processes of politics, economics, and
technology. To understand the process of frequency allocation.
22

the construction of an adequate model of allocation in the
existing political climate is necessary. The construction of
such a frequency allocation model is beyond the scope of this
25thesis (see the Williams and Collins thesis for one approach)
The discussion uill be confined to the concept of allocation
stated in the first chapter and how frequencies are managed
within the United States by the Federal Government and by the
United States Military.
The next section will concern itself with ITU allocation
of frequencies to services and the political problems associ-
ated with it.
B. FREQUENCY ALLOCATION: THE ITU VIEW
Frequency allocation involves the administrative division
of the radio frequency spectrum into bands, and the classi-
fication of spectrum-using operations (communications, radio-
? ft
location, etc.) into groups called services. These frequency
bands are assigned to specific services on either a worldwide
or regional basis. Figure 3 shows the current ITU regions.
As an example, the Radio Regulations , the primary product of
the ITU, allocates the 7100-73000 kilohertz band to broadcast-
ing in Regions 1 & 3, but allocate the same band to amateur
28
use in Region 2 (the United States and Possessions)
.
A look at Figure 4 shows that frequencies have differing
characteristics. Therefore, some are more suited to one radio
service than another. For example, high frequencies (3-30
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communications, but are not useful for high capacity circuits
or for television. Frequencies lower in the spectrum are use-
ful for long-range search radar, but radio frequencies high
in the spectrum are required for the detection of small cross-
section targets. Ideally, frequencies should be allocated
to services based on their characteristics. It is doubtful
that the first allocation of frequencies to radio communica-
29tions was based on their propagation characteristics. It
is highly probable that the frequency of operation of the
first radio transmitter was more a matter of chance than con-
scious choice. In the earliest days of radio frequency com-
munications technology limited transmitter frequency selection
The first radio transmitters were constructed at a time when
little was known about the propagation characteristics of
electromagnetic waves. Therefore, allocation of frequencies
to the first radio communication services was more a matter of
conveniece than technology. This methodology has been self-
perpetuating; increased frequency allocations for existing
services were made in adjacent bands perhaps preventing more
suitable allocation at a later date.
As the value of radio communications became more apparent,
the demand for additional services (e.g. radiotelephone) and
expansion of existing services grew. Other services were
started at a time when technology could not adequately deter-
mine if the frequency band allocated to the service was techno-
logically the most apropos for that service. The current
political-economic climate hinders the allocation/reallocation
26

of frequencies based on technology, but demands the careful
assessment of the political and economic implications of the
allocations. It has proved impossible, in some cases, to allo-
cate frequencies to the services for which they are techno-
logically best suited. A possible cause is the potential loss
of capital investment in equipment designed to operate on those
frequencies. Even though the characteristics of a frequency
may be well-documented, the movement of existing services from
these bands to accommodate the technologically more suitable
service carries too great an economic cost.
The ITU member nations, through mutual agreement, allocate
frequencies to services by geographic regions. The ITU mem-
ber delegations make frequency allocation recommendations
based on technical considerations. But the actual allocations
are made as a result of the political, technical, and economic
justifications presented by these same member nations. These
agreements have the force of treaty status when signed by the
member nations. Any reallocation scheme must consider the
economic impact on the capital investments in existing com-
munication-electronics systems before reallocating the spectrum,
Each ITU member nation is allowed to construct its conference
delegation from both the private and public sector to encourage
a balance of views presented at the conferences. This free-
dom allows both technical and economic expertise to be brought
to bear on the conference agenda items. However, it is also
noticeable that some nations have brought only their political
31bargaining team to Radio Conferences. This has been true
27

especially in the case of the LDC ' S who possess little techni-
cal expertise and can, therefore, compete only in the non-
technical area.
The current allocation scheme strongly favors the developed
nations. Frequency assignements within an allocated band are
made on a first-come, first-served basis. The developed
nations, having the sophisticated technology necessary to be
first off the mark in claiming frequencies for use, got the
majority of available spectrum within that allocation. Conse-
quently, Regions 1 & 3 have been allocated portions of the
spectrum which may prove to be unusable for many of the coun-
32tries m those regions. The easily usable portion of the
spectrum in Regions 1 & 3 have been claimed by the developed
nations in that area leaving potentially useless frequencies
for use by the LDC ' S . It is understandable that the LDC ' S are
demanding a change in this scheme which requires a change in
the principle of frequency allocation. They are demanding
33that frequencies be allocated on a national basis. In essence,
the LDC'S demand that a portion of the spectrum be set aside,
34
unused, until they are ready to use it. It is not clear
whether the LDC'S motivation is conscious or unconscious, overt
or covert, toward stockpiling for future planned use, or for
use as a source of income. However, the effect will be the
same—administratively unusable portions of the spectrum
35
av/aiting use by a designated user. Of particular attractive-
ness to LDC'S is the real potential for turning allocated
36frequencies into cash by either leasing frequencies to users
28

(especially developed nations needing more spectrum space)
or by enticing businesses to settle in LDC ' S territory because
of the promise of available frequencies.
In suiranary, prior to the emergence of the LDC'S as an ITU
37political power m the 19 70 's the developed nations had
claimed for themselves
, through allocations , ninety percent of
3 8
the spectrum. The United States, in particular, was a leader
in the development of technology and was able to get what it
39
wanted at radio conferences by expert influence. Allocation
decisions were traditionally based upon a consensus of the most
efficient and technically sound way to divide and use the spec-
40
trum. The developed nations made heavy capital investments
in equipment designed to operate within the frequency alloca-
tions they had formulated. However, the emerging Third World
countries viewed colonialism as equivalent to economic exploi-
tation, foreign capital, large Western corporations, and the
capitalist system in general. To end colonialism, therefore,
the exploited nations needed to acquire political independence
and gain control over their economies, natural resources, and
economic development policies. In their thesis Williams and
Collins point out that the LDC'S saw modern telecommunications
technology as their right and the radio frequency spectrum as
a world resource to which they are entitled a share. Sophisti-
cated telecommunication systems were perceived as a source of
national pride and as weapons in the stuggle for political and
41
economic survival. Further, Williams and Collins point out
that nations with a sophisticated worldwide communications
29

system are usually more attractive to foreign investors. The
LDC ' S perceive access to these systems and spectrum space as
a source of revenue. The LDC ' S see that the telecommunications
systems of the developed nations have proved to be an economic
resource for the developed nations. They, therefore, wish to
do the same for themselves. The LDC'S, through bloc voting,
have the power to gain access to these things on their own
terms, i.e., frequencies utilized and technical/financial aid
42for telecommunication systems. As previously stated the
LDC'S may attempt to use bloc voting tactics to dominate future
radio conferences to gain allocations favorable to their interests
C. CONCLUSION
Ideally, the technical consultative committees and ad hoc
r
working groups see themselves functioning free of outside pres-
sures. However, the growing interdependence of the nations of
the world and the desire of the LDC'S to share in the wealth
of industrialized nations is forcing solutions to communications-
electronics problems which may be technically infeasible, or,
at best, on the very fringe of advancing technology. The techi-
cal experts and engineers are then assigned the responsibility
to provide the mechanism necessary to implement the consensus
solution. For example, in order to make more spectrum available
for the burgeoning satellite technology, a portion of the spec-
trum in the 40 gigahertz range has been set aside for satellite
up/down links. This frequency range is subject to severe
attenuation by free space losses, oxygen molecule absorption,
precipitation, etc. Additionally, lightweight satellite-borne
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transmitters with sufficient power to overocme' attenuation
losses characteristic of this frequency range have yet to be
built. From a technical standpoint the 10-14 gigahertz band
is more suited to this use because the attenuation losses are
less severe. Further, in Geneva in 1974, Third World Countries
imposed an allocation scheme based on nationalism rather than
technology. Countries without the economic and technical
resources to send both a diplomatic and engineering team to
the conference sent only a diplomatic team to secure their
43
voting rights at the conference. The developing nations
dominated the non-voting technical gatherings as expected,
but the LDC ' s were able to impose allocations without consider-
ation of engineering, geographical, and operational considera-
tions. The result was to encumber the coastal radiotelephone
band with allotments to countries with no coastlines and the
allotment of the same high frequency channels to as many as
fifteen countries. These countries are in such close proximity
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that mutual interference is virtually assured.
Balanced decision making (i.e., decision-making based on
analysis of pertinent economic and technical factors) can be
achieved by carefully counterpoising technology, bargaining,
economics, and politics. It is difficult to specify the weight
that should be given to any of these facets . The agreements
resulting from such balanced decision-making must be of such
caliber that no one nation or coalition of nations will want
to opt out of the agreement. No nation or coalition of nations
should be able to preceive that, as an individual or coalition.
31

they will benefit more by opting out than if they had remained
with the majority.
Another problem facing the International Telcommunication
Union (ITU) is a lack of planning for the future. The ITU
appears to be following the well-established axiom of inter-
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national affairs, the rule of immediacy. In practice, this
axiom says that changes take place incrementally and only in
the face of adversity. Planning is often neglected because
managers
:
1) do no^ always think about the future;
2) are overly confident or overly pessimistic about the
future
;
3) are impatient and unable to delay gratification;
4) cannot overcome the situational constraints of a
lack of time to plan, lack of information on which
to base plans, etc.;
5) base incentives, rewards, and penalties on short-term
performance;
6) transfer too frequently; and,
7) often leave planning to staffs instead of doing it
themselves.
In a World marked by growing interdependence of nations
for sources of ra\7 materials, markets for products, etc., the
ITU cannot avoid making decisions and providing guidance to
technicians. This guidance is necessary to help channel the
power of technological innovation into providing the method-
ology for implementing solutions based on a balance of tech-
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nology, economics, and politics.

One way to free the ITU conferences from the non-technical
issues which tend to divert the energy of the conferences from
technical work is to implement a proposal made by the United
States. The United States has long maintained that the ITU
should be strictly a technical forum promoting improved tele-
communications through the application of sound technology.
The United States proposed that such issues as ITU membership,
voting rights, and rights to geostationary orbit positions
be left to the United Nations while ITU conferences are kept
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a technical forum. The author feels that by keeping the
ITU a strictly technical forum, devoid of non-technical con-
siderations may tend to weaken the ITU. The technical organi-
zation already exists within the ITU's structure for dealing
with issues amenable to technical solutions. The author
acknowledges the legal and political arguments put forth in
dealing with issues such as geostationary orbit positions, but
he believes that the ITU has the necessary resources to decide
the issue. However, the membership and voting rights issues
may be more suitable for resolution by the United Nations.
Further, the author speculates that the United States may see
the ITU as a technical forum in which the U.S. wields signifi-
cant influence in the form of technical expertise. Whereas
in a more political arena the U.S. may perceive itself as
having less influence.
The next chapter will discuss the Federal Government's role
in frequency allocation and assignment in the United States
& Possessions. The role of four major frequency management
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agencies will be reviewed. Finally, a discussion of the
centralization-decentralization of frequency management policy
in the United States will be given.
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III. THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION
In this chapter the primary players involved in frequency
management for the Federal Government will be introduced. Fur-
ther, the rationale for the Federal Government's involvement
in frequency management will be discussed.
The four major groups that will be introduced are:
1) The Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches of the
Federal Government; 2) the Department of State; 3) the Depart-
ment of Commerce's National Telecommunication and Information
Administration (NTIA) ; and, 4) the Department of Defense (DoD)
.
The role of the Department of Defense in frequency management
will be discussed briefly here and in more detail in Chapter
Four.
Also, the frequency coordination process at the National
Level will be outlined. Finally, national telecommunications
policy and the issue of its centralization-decentralization will
be discussed.
A. UNITED STATES FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT
The allocation of frequencies to services falls into the
broader activity called frequency management. Because the
radio frequency spectrum is viewed as a natural resource,
albeit a man-made one, it is appropriate to discuss the process
of frequency allocation as a part of managing this resource.
The Federal Government considers the radio frequency spec-
49trum to be a vital natural resource. Any rights of users
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within the United States to operate on any radio frequencies
are rights held by the United States as a whole. Such rights
are transferred by law by the Federal Government from one user
to another in keeping with the National interest. This trans-
fer of rights to use radio frequencies is handled by the
Federal Communications Commission for the private sector and
the National Telecommunications and Information Adminstration
in the public sector.
Consistent with the right to use a natural resource is
the obligation or responsibility to prudently use that resource
—
a process called resource management. Here resource management
is defined as the process of making decisions about how resources
should be used, by whom, and their distribution among competing
demands. In this instance resource management is synonomous
with frequency management.
In general, resource management is an essential role of
the Federal Government. Therefore, frequency management is
the responsibility of the Federal Government, especially since
the Government is the largest single user of the radio fre-
quency spectrum in the United States. Frequency management
includes 1) the establishment of national frequency manage-
ment objectives, 2) the formulation and promulgation of
national frequency management policies designed to achieve
the objectives, and 3) the implementation of these policies.
Further, it encompasses the steps taken to supervise, regu-
late, and manage the use of the radio frequency spectrum to
preclude and reconcile competing uses and demands upon the
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spectrum. Simultaneously it is necessary to discover alterna-
tives to radio frequency spectrum usage where feasible. This
will relieve some of the congestion on the spectrum while con-
serving it for future use. Certainly, there are legitimate
reasons for using the spectrum, but many new and existing
circuits could be adequately accommodated on existing common-
user circuits vice establishing new circuits.
The next subsections will discuss the role of the four
major frequency management groups within the Federal Government,
1. The Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches
The Executive and Legislative Branches of the Govern-
ment influence the management of the radio frequency spectrum
through the formulation and promulgation of policies and regu-
lations governing the use of radio frequencies. For example,
the Congress gives the President the authority to assign radio
frequencies to Federal Government Radio Stations through the
Communications Act of 19 34 (Title 47, U.S. Code, beginning
with Section 151) . The Carter Administration has subsequently
delegated this authority to the Administrator, National Tele-
communications and Information Administration (NTIA) located
within the Commerce Department (the functions relating to the
assignment of frequencies to radio stations belonging to and
operated by the United States were first delegated to the
Secretary of Commerce by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 19 77
and Executive Order 12046 of 26 March, 1978. These functions
were subsequently delegated to the Assistant Secretary of
Commerce—Administrator NTIA—by Department of Commerce
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Organization Order 10-10 of 9 May, 1978) . The Communications
Act of 1934 also established the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) and made it responsible for the management of
the spectriim used by private citizens, local government, and
state governments. This action created a parallel radio fre-
quency management hierarchy in the United States as shown in
Figure 5. This figure shows U.S. government users falling
under the administrative control of the National Telecommu-
nications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Inter-
department Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) . Commercial and
private users of the spectrum fall under the regulatory con-
trol of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) . In
recognition of this parallel or dual jurisdiction over the
radio frequency spectrum, the Federal Government and the FCC
have divided the spectrum into three National categories of
bands: exclusive Federal Government usage bands, exclusive
non-Federal Government bands , and bands shared by the Federal
Government and non-Federal Government users. The NTIA admin-
isters the Federal Government band while the FCC administers
the non-Federal Government band. The shared band is adminis-
tered through cooperation between the FCC and the IRAC.
The President maintains influence over both the NTIA
and the FCC by his power of appointment of the Administrator,
NTIA and the FCC Commissioners (Commissioners are appointed
for seven year terms) . The President can appoint up to four




















































Presidential influence over the seven-man Commission. Con-
gress exercises control over the FCC through:
1) the House Committee on Interstate Commerce and
Foreign Commerce through the Subcommittee on Over-
sight and Investigations;
2) the House Committee on Commerce, Science, Transpor-
tation through the Subcommittee on Communications;
and,
3) the Senate Committee on Government Affairs.
Although the FCC is an independent agency, it is
directly accountable to the Congress of the United States
.
Congressional influence and accountability is in the form of
oversight activities, passage of laws, the budget, and approval
of Presidential appointments as the Administrator, NTIA and
the Chairman of the FCC.
The Congress and President further influence the manage-
ment of telecommunications through both formal and informal
bargaining around the National Budget and through the Office
of Management and Budget, i.e., the procurement of communications-
electronics equipment and systems for the Federal Government
and the Budget for the FCC. The United States Government con-
sumes approximately forty-seven percent of the communications-
electronics industry's output. This level of consumption
is a very powerful influence. The President also provides
guidance to:
1) The Secretary of State, in his role of conducting




2) the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in his role as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
Finally, the Judicial Branch may review and decide on
the Constitutionality or legality of all Presidential (NTIA)
and Congressional (FCC) decisions and policies. Further,
Judiciary may act as judge in disputes between the various
agencies of the Federal Government.
2. Department of State
The formal role of the Department of State in telecom-
munications consists of:
1) preparation for international conferences including,
a) selection of delegates for conferences, and
b) formulation of negotiating positions;
2) participation on the U.S. International Radio Con-
sultative Committee of the ITU;
3) representing the United States on the ITU Administra-
tive Council;
4) making recommendations concerning the ratification of
treaties; and,
5) representing the United States in bilateral arrange-
ments or negotiations
.
In essence, the role of the State Department is to act
as the official negotiator in the international forum. Al-
though this may seem to be a very limited role in frequency
management, it is crucial because this is the manner in which
the United States interjects and projects its telecommunications
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goals internationally and determines the extent of U.S. par-
ticipation in international telecommunications trade.
3. Department of Commerce^ National Telecommunications &
Information Administration
The third group in the national frequency management
hierarchy is the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration. Figure 5 shov/s the relative position of the
NTIA within the hierarchy. This figure represents the au-
thor's view of the hierarchy and is the result of the research
for this thesis which included interviews with various personnel
within some of the agencies shown in the hierarchy. Figure 5
shows a more detailed picture of the frequency management
hierarchy shown in Figure 1. The connections between the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
,
the Department
of State (State) , and the Department of Commerce-NTIA (NTIA)
are indicate of frequency management infoirmation flow as in
Figure 1. The dashed line between the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Communications, Command, Control, & Intelli-
gence (ASD C & I) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff represents
a flow of guidance and policy for the use of the radio fre-
quency spectrum. The dotted lines between the White House,
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (FCC) represent a
mutual exchange of views and efforts toward mutual cooperation
in management of the radio frequency spectrum. The arrows
between the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) , NTIA, and
the FCC are representative of 0MB ' s role as an arbiter of disputes in
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Ifrequency allocation or assignment between NTIA and the FCC.
The connections below the IRAC , U.S. Military Communications
Board-Joint Frequency Panel CUSMCEB-J/FP) , and Unified Com-
mander are indicative of radio frequency allocations and
assignment actions. They represent lines of formal control
of the spectrum.
The NTIA was formed by the Carter Administration to
replace the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) , which
was part of the Executive Branch, and the Office of Telecom-
munications, Department of Commerce.
The purposes of the NTIA can be summarized as follows:
1) to provide expert analysis in telecommunications
policy and policy research;
2) to promote telecommunications technology via,
a) research and development,
b) being a national clearinghouse for technological
information,
c) assisting in designing communications systems
serving the goals of other Governmental units;
and,
3) to manage and allocate the Federal Government's portion
52
of the radio frequency spectrum.
This last item specifically includes.
Assign frequencies to, and amend, modify, and rovoke
frequency assignments for radio stations belonging to
and operated by the United States, make frequency spec-
trum assignment allocation and use, and provide the
various departments and agencies with guidance to
assure that their conduct of telecomm\inications
activities is consistent with these policies. . ,
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Develop in cooperation with, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, a comprehensive long-range plan
for improved management of all electromagnetic
spectrum resources, including jointly, determining
the National Table of Frequency Allocations . 53
Essentially the NTIA provides support for the tele-
communications activities of other Government agencies in
the form of design and engineering support. Further, it over-
sees the implementation of national telecommunications policy.
The frequency management functions of the NTIA are
actually performed by the Associate Administrator, Office of
Federal Systems and Spectrum Management. Thus the President's
responsibility for the assignment of radio frequencies to
Federal Government owned and operated radio stations is dele-
gated to a third eschelon unit within the Federal hierarchy.
This point will be important in the discussion of the centrali-
zation-decentralization of National telecommunications policy.
The Office of Federal Systems and Spectrum Management
also provides the staff support for the Interdepartment Radio
Advisory Committee (IRAC)
.
a. Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee
The Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee was
established on 22 June 1922, as the Interdepartment Advisory
Committee on Government Radio Broadcasting. In 192 3, its
name was changed to its present name. Initially, the IRAC
was not the result of Legislative or Presidential dictates.
It was formed spontaneously by interested Government agencies
because very early in the growth of Government owned and operated
radio stations it became apparent that cooperation would enhance
44

interference-free functioning between Government radio stations.
The IRAC advised and reported to the President on frequency
assignments to Government radio stations without official
sanctioning until 8 April 1927. On that date President Calvin
Coolidge sent a letter to Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover
affirming the actions of the IRAC in assuming responsibility
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on behalf of the President. Since then the IRAC has acted
as a clearinghouse in the coordination and assignment of fre-
quencies to radio stations of the Federal Government.
The mission of the IRAC is to formulate objectives,
policies, plans, and actions in connection with the management
and use of the radio frequency spectrum in the National interest
The Committee coordinates the assignment of frequencies for
government radio station use within the United States and Pos-
sessions among various government agencies. The FCC provides
a liaison representative to the IRAC to ensure coordination
between the Government and non-Government portions of the spec-
trum and especially in the shared portions of the spectrum.
The IRAC has four major subcommittees and various
ad hoc working groups. The four major subcommittees are the
Spectrum Planning Subcommittee (SPS) , the Frequency Allocation
Subcommittee (FAS) , the Technical Subcommittee (TSC) , and the
International Notification Group (ING)
.
The role of the Spectrum Planning Subcommittee is
planning for the apportionment of the radio frequency spectrum
in support of existing and anticipated services. The SPS also
concerns itself with the apportionment of the spectrum between
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Government and non-Government users. Specifically, the SPS
is tasked by the IRAC to consider
Current and planned National and International
frequency uses, and the optimum placement of
radio services with a view to the most effective
use of spectrum in the overall National interest.
. .
. . . Specific proposals for expansion, reduction,
or other changes in the allocated frequency bands;
and the International aspects of changes recommended
to the IRAC.55
The SPS is, therefore, predominantly the planning
and policy formulation body for the whole IRAC and, consequently,
for the Federal Government as a whole.
The role of the Frequency Allocation Subcommittee
(FAS) is to carry out the assignment of frequencies to Govern-
ment users. The FAS has two subcommittees: the Aeronautical
Assignment Group (AAG) and the Military Assignment Group (MAG)
.
The AAG handles assignment and coordination of frequencies
primarily concerned with the aeronautical mobile and aero-
nautical radionavigation services. The AAG is chaired by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) . The MAG handles assign-
men and coordination of frequencies of primary concern to the
military services. Matters which are not amenabale to solution
by the MAG or AAG membership are submitted to the FAS for
resolution.
Prior to the use of any communications-electronics
system within the United States and Possessions, U.S. Govern-
ment departments and agencies are required to obtain authori-
zation for its use from the FAS. This authorization is for
specific channel use and contains any applicable constraints.
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For the Navy this authorization is obtained via the Navy Elec-
tromagnetic Spectrum Center (NAVEMSCEN) , the Navy's representative
on the IRAC. See Chapter Three for NAVEMSCEN's role. '
^X^2>
Rarely does the MAG or AAG meet in formal session.
Virtually all coordination is done on an informal basis, that
is, without formal meetings or agendas. This is possible be-
cause discrete assignments have been made to each of the Airmed
Forces within the bands of the spectrum designated for Govern-
ment use. Thus, little coordination is required unless one
Service wants to use another's assignment. If the group con-
curs in an assignment, formal approval is forthcoming from the
Frequency Assignment Subcommittee.
The Technical Subcommittee (TSC) assists the Adminis-
trator, National Telecommunications & Information Administration,
in handling problems concerning frequency allocations for new
communications-electronics systems. The TSC's major functions
include evaluating the technical bases for spectrum manage-
ment, issuing technical reports concerning new and existing
techniques for the utilization of the spectrum, and recommend-
ing and developing new equipment standards. The TSC must be
acutely aware of International Telecommunication Union recom-
mended standards. A major function of the TSC is, therefore,
to ensure system compatibility and interconnectivity
.
The last major subcommittee of the IRAC is the Inter-
national Notification Group CING) . The subcommittee prepares
responses to ITU questionnaires and handles correspondence
related to the registration of United States frequency assignments
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with the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB)
of the International Telecommunication Union.
4, Department of Defense
The Department of Defense (DoD) is a separate entity
in the National spectrum management hierarchy. Considerations
pertaining to the use of the radio frequency spectrum may
involve the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) , Director
of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) , Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control, and Intel-
ligence (ASD C &I) , etc. The focus of frequency management
in DoD is the staffs of the military departments (MILDEPS)
who respond through the joint staff or intradepartmental chain
in accordance with the matter under consideration. Spectrum
management authority may flow through multi-lateral Government
Channels (IRAC) for frequency management matters within the
United States & Possessions or-through strictly military chan-
nels (U.S. Military Communications-Electronics Board—USMCEB)
for all other military matters worldwide. For example, the
coordination of a single Department of the Navy frequency
request may, depending on geographic area, go through both
I
chains for approval. It is noteworthy, therefore, that the
Department of Defense, per se, does not have an IRAC repre-
I
sentative even though it controls the largest telecommunica-
tions network in the Federal Government, the Defense Communica-
tions System (DCS) . Figures provided by the NTIA show that
as of 1 June 1979, the Armed Forces controlled forty-two
percent of the frequencies assigned to the Federal Government.
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Because the DCS consists of th.e combined assets of the indi-
vidual Service's communications systems, the DCS is the largest
single user of radio frequencies in the United States. The
Director of the Defense Communications Agency, as the senior
manager of the DCS, gets frequency support for the DCS through
the individual Armed Services, whose combined assets form the
DCS.
Although there are representatives from each of the
Armed Services on the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee,
no single person acts on behalf of the Department of Defense
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as a department. Collectively, the Armed Service representa-
tives represent the Department of Defense's intersts , but are
responsible only to their parent Service in their actions^ Informed
sources in the IRAC say that the Service representatives
usually present a united front when opposing other Government
representatives concerning these items of mutual interest to
the Services.
The preceeding sections have introduced the major
players in the Federal frequency management hierarchy . How-
ever, the author was unable to ascertain exactly how some of
the various players actually interacted to manage the radio
frequency spectrum for the Federal Government. The exact
mechanism by which the IRAC, for example, conducts its busi-
ness is not known to the author as the IRAC publishes no
records of its meetings.
Drawing on what information is available, the following
section will discuss how these players interact. The discussion
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of how the military interacts with the IRAC and within itself
will be discussed in the next chapter,
B. FREQUENCY COORDINATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
Before beginning a discussion of frequency coordination
at any level it is important to define this term. The author
has found, in reviewing available literature, that this term
has varying definitions depending on the background of the
author. Some authors use it in various ways without specify-
ing the subtleties in its use. For the purpose of this thesis
the author defines frequency coordination as a process of
cooperation, negotiation, and bargaining among radio frequency
spectrum users or potential users by which users achieve free-
dom from unacceptable interference.
The military's definition of coordination is more succinct,
but not as explicative of the actual mechanism of coordination.
The military definition of coordination is the process of
affecting arrangements and technical liaison for the purpose
of minimizing electromagnetic interference through cooperative
5 8
use of the radio frequency spectrum.
The process of frequency coordination begins with the
assignment of a mission to a Government agency by the President
or the Congress. For example, part of the Navy's and Marine
Corps' mission or function is to organize, train, and equip
Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and
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sustained combat operations at sea. Then program planning
budgets to carry out the assigned mission are submitted by
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program managers to the agency head. Office of Management and
Budget, the President, and the Congress.
Upon approval and appropriation of funds, the Government
agency analyzes its mission to determine the communications-
electronics support requirements. For example, what must be
done to maintain command and control over the forces at sea
and how will these forces be able to locate the enemy? Rea-
sonably, radiolocation (radar) systems and radio communication
systems would be useful in carrying out the Navy's mission.
Each Government agency is free to decide, in the light of
policies, rules, regulations, frequency allocations, and
availability of frequencies, whether, and how much communica-
tions-electronics support is needed to carry out its mission.
The agency makes the necessary technical studies , selects
possible frequencies, coordinates the selections with other
agencies, and files an application for frequency assignment
with the Executive Secretary of the Interdepartment Radio
Advisory Committee (IRAC)
.
If it becomes apparent that frequency support is not avail-
able without impacting existing operations, the IRAC is con-
sulted. When new types of communications-electronics equipments
are required, an electromagnetic compatibility analysis is
conducted to determine whether there will be an adverse impact
on existing operations. Both Government agencies and the Armed
Services are required to obtain frequency allocation/assignments




In ca,ses where spectrum support is possible without electro-
magnetic compatability analysis, the agency frequency manager
consults frequency assignment/usage records, conducts the
necessary technical studies, and coordinates the frequency
selection with the other agencies at the local level. The
agency frequency manager then files an application with the
Executive Secretary of the IRAC. If the proposal is not tech-
nically compatible with existing authorizations, adjustments
are made or the process is repeated until a soluion is found.
To ensure Government/non-Government coordination the FCC
Liaison Representative to the IRAC submits memoranda requests
for coordination on non-Government use of frequencies in
shared frequency bands, and in other bands when he considers
mutual interference with Government operations may occur.
This procedure would appear to ensure coordination and cooper-
ation between the two sectors; however, an informed Government
user indicates that Government users do not always record used
frequencies inferring an effort to prevent the tracing of
sources of interference with non-Government users. One com-
ment was made that, ". . . if we don't record the (frequency)
assignment, they (the FCC) won't know it's us causing the
interference.
"
The IRAC Secretariat screens the applications for accuracy,
completeness, and compliance with procedure. Applications
that have been screened and accepted are placed on the Fre-
quency Assignment Subcommittee (FAS) agenda.
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Each month the FAS/FCC Liaison considers pending items and
takes mutually agreed actions for assignment actions within
policy guidance. Applications are referred to the full IRAC/
FCC for resolution when policy guidance is needed, agreement
cannot be reached by the FAS/FCC Liaison, or an agency requests
it. Matters which then cannot be resolved are referred to the
Office of Management and Budget (0MB) for resolution.
Once a frequency allocation or assignment is approved,
the IRAC Secretariat updates the Government Master File from
which it prints the list of Frequency Assignments to Govern-
ment Radio Stations. The department or agency representative,
i.e., the Navy Electromagnetic Spectrum Center (NAVEMSCEN) for
the Navy, then authorizes the use of the frequency by the
department's requester.
This section has dealth with the coordination and assign-
ment of frequencies at the National Level. The author has
presented an overview of how the Federal Government manages
frequencies used by the various agencies and departments of
the Government.
The final section deals with the issue of telecommunica-
tions policy and its centralization-decentralization.
C. TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY
Telecommunications policies, such as adherence to the
International Telecommunications Union frequency allocation
plan, are made by the Congress, the Courts, the President,
and the NTIA's Administrator for the agencies and establish-
ments of the Federal Government. The Federal Communications
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Coininission makes policy in th.e private sector. Policy is
made:
1) through treaties to which the United States adheres;
2) through executive agreements between departments;
3) by executive departments and agencies in the discharge
of their telecommunication responsibilities; and,
4) by custom and precedent.
These policies may be separated into three categories: National
Telecommunications Policy (for International coordination)
;
Telecommunications Policy applying to the Federal Government
(domestic policies) ; and. Federal Communications Commission
Telecommunications Policy.
For the purpose of this thesis, policy is defined as a
definite method of action chosen from alternative courses of
action by a government in the light of given conditions to
6 1
guide and determine present and future decisions . Stated
policy is an essential means of managing uncertainty. Policy
expresses the intention of the policy-maker to follow certain
prescribed measures in order to achieve an end. If the most
effective means to achieve the desired end were clear, common
sense could constitute policy. Policy-making reduces the uncer-
tainties that must be considered by those having the responsi-
bility for planning, decision-making, or both. Conflicts
between values or relative effectiveness of alternative courses
of action are examples of such uncertainties.
Within any government, stated policy helps to ensure that
separate decisions support one another in sustaining progress
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toward consensus goals. The more decentralized the decision-
making in government, the more essential policy-making becomes
.
As stated above, each individual department and agency is re-
sponsible for deciding the extent of its communications-elec-
tronics support requirements. Policy, therefore, becomes
essential in this instance. For example, it is is the policy
of the Federal Government that common-user telecommunications
circuits are to be utilized wherever possible in lieu of estab-
lishing new dedicated circuits, then agencies will make every
effort to identify such circuits before trying to establish
dedicated circuits. For extragovernmental organizations,
policy reduces the uncertainty of governmental action.
An Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies report states:
The definition of the Federal government's role in the
field of telecommunications is itself a policy issue
that is central to the design of the government's policy
making system; for the federal role in telecommunications
must be consistent with its responsibilities in defense,
international trade, and the maintenance of United States
scientific and technological leadership, and the procure-
ment of telecommunications systems and services for the
government's own use. Federal roles in health, educa-
tion, welfare, and transportation also have implications
for telecommunications policy.
The author interprets this to mean that Federal telecommunica-
tions policy can either help people obtain or deprive them of
benefits resulting from the more efficient operation of Federal
agencies serving the public. For example, the redirecting of
funds saved as a result of substituting tele-conferencing
systems for expensive transportation to conferences.
In general, the telecommunications policy which does exist
has evolved in response to specific issues on an ad hoc
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piecemeal basis rather than on a conscious, systematic, or
6 1
sophisticated basis. The author believes the piecemeal na-
ture of present telecommunications policy is not conductive
to optimum performance of telecommunications activities and
requirements of the Federal Government.
Because telecommunications has been historically viewed
by users in a mission-support role, no centralized authority
for managing the spectrum exists. Responsibility for communi-
cations-electronics system specifications is dispersed among
a myriad of mission-oriented agencies. The procurement of
telecommunications systems is viewed as a mission-support
function without consideration of an overall telecommunica-
tions policy. It should be noted that this practice of
decentralized system specifications is itself a policy. The
purchasing power of the Federal Government in the acquisition
cycle helps to drive telecommunications technology, but the
Government's R&D and acquistion efforts have not been
coordinated to ensure that the benefits of telecommunications
technology are realized. The acquisition cycle serves an
important indirect function that is not always recognized; it
provides a unique opportunity to develop and introduce inno-
vative operational and support concepts.
Senator Harrison Schmitt, in prepared remarks for Congress
said.
National telecommunications policies must be closely
coordinated with other domestic and international
policies.
. .
I am afraid that once again the Adminis-
tration has missed the fact that all international
policy must be coordinated to be successful. ^'^
56

Although Senator Schmitt was speaking specifically of the
United States preparations for the General World Administrative
Radio Conference-1979 (GWARC-79)
, his remarks are applicable
to frequency management. He further argues that the United
States is jeopardizing its multi-billion dollar investment in
communications-electronics systems because no firm policies
are being formulated concerning frequency allocations. In
response to a personal letter from the author concerning
national telecommunications policy. Senator Schmitt did not
specifically address the issue of policy. A telephone inter-
view with a National Telecommunications & Information Adminis-
tration official may have been an indicator of why Senator
Schmitt was unable to reply. The official stated that no
conscious policy or long-range plan currently exists, but
there is one in the formulation stages.
The author believes the issue is whether one organization
should act as the central policy-making body for communications-
electronics systems development and frequency management policy,
or whether the United States should continue its current policy-
making practices. A second issue is, if centralization is to
be adopted, at what level in the Government hierarchy should
this centralized organization exist? Should telecommunica-
tion policy be established by a third eschelon official as it
is now, i.e., the Administrator of the National Telecommunica-
tions & Information Administration, or should it be vested in
the highest echelon, the Executive Office of the President?
The disbanding of the Office of Telecommunications Policy is
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seen by the proponents of centralization as the Carter Adminis-
tration's view of the relative importance of telecommunications
policy; it has been relegated to a lower level of importance.
Although a small telecommunications staff will be maintained
in the Executive Office as a part of the Domestic Policy
Staff, its qualifications are unknown. However, as a result
of its small size the author believes that it will lack the
ability to be the focus for coordinating telecommunications
policy.
This alleged lowering of status is inappropriate in view
of the opening lines of a publication entitled The Radio Fre-
quency Spectrum, United States Use and Management which says
,
The United States is vitally dependent upon the
use of the Radio Spectrum to carry out national
policies and achieve goals. Use of the spectrum
is vital to the security and welfare of the Na-
tion and to the conduct of its foreign affairs.
This use exerts a powerful influence on our every-
day lives, in countless ways, annually contribut-
ing significantly to the Nation's growth and
economy, 65
If the use of the radio frequency spectrum is so vital to
U.S. interests, it appears inconsistent in the author's view
to relegate telecommunications policy to third or fourth eche-
lon officials. The author believes that without coordinated
policy-making and management the Nation will be faced with
having communication-electronic systems that face overly
restrictive standards, and the denial of telecommunications
services because of networking problems. The continuing ab-
sence of long-range planning reflects the Federal Government's
historical perspective of telecommunications as exclusively
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a mission-support function rather than a crucial area of pub-
g c
lie policy on its own.
As early as the Truman administration a recommendation
was made for the:
Immediate establishment in the Executive Office of the
President.
. .
a telecommunications advisory board.
. .
to advise and assist the President in the discharge of
his responsibilities in the telecommunications field.
Its task would include formulating and recommending
broad national policies in this field giving advice and
assistance in the formulation of policies in positions
for international telecommunications negotiations.^^
Further, in a dissertation on Frequency Assignment Admin-
istration Control, Donald R. MacQuivey stated,
. . .
the most desirable location for the control of
the optimum frequency management system should be in
the Executive Office of the President because the
prestige of that Office and its experience in the
developing of rules, settlements of inter-agency
disputes and its close relationship to decision ^p
making of nationwide scope, concern and importance.
In 196 7, a Lyndon Johnson appointed task force concluded
that the Federal Government required,
. . . a long-range planning policy-formulating and
coordinating and mission-support capability which can
serve to integrate the various roles in which the
Executive Branch is presently engaged. ^9
In 1969, the General Accounting Office reported,
. . .
that a realignment of existing NSC structure and
organizational arrangements should be undertaken. As a
first and essential step, an organization or entity at
the highest level of the Executive Branch of government,
free of any conflicting roles, should be put in charge
of the government's telecommunications activities. . .
and serve as the government's focal point for telecom-
munications policy and planning. . .'^
Decentralized policy-making leaves us with a confused,
and often contradictory, patchwork of policies. This patch-
work of policies is especially costly on the domestic scene;
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each governmental agency is free to determine its own commu-
nications-electronics systems requirements. This generates
a plethora of communications-electronics systems which dupli-
cate existing systems, dedicated systems where existing
common-user systems are underutilized, and, therefore, are
more costly, and lack interconnectivity with other systems.
Informed opponents of centralization view this centraliza-
tion policy as dangerous. A centralized body may suffer from
tunnel-vision, refusing to accept ideas and alternatives from
sources outside the body. The acceptance of fresh ideas from
outside sources could provide critical perspectives on current
policies and suggest directions for new policy or changes in
policy. The author believes a centralized body could more
successfully coordinate telecommunications policy with other
United States policies. For example, a policy must be coordi-
nated for the United States privately owned portion of INTELSAT,
for the U.S. Military's participation in NATO telecommunica-
tions, and for international-transoceanic cable connections.
Further, opponents of centralization see centralization
efforts as destroying the autonomy of the Governmental depart-
ments and agencies in deicision-making by saddling them with
unnecessary constraints. Because telecommunications are tra-
ditionally viewed as purely mission-support functions, pro-
ponents of decentralization insist that only the individual
department or agency can adequately determine communications-
electronics for conducting their assigned mission. Outside
interference, such as that from a centralized telecommunication
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policy-making body would only serve to inhibit them from
choosing the optimum communications-electronics system in
terms of money, manpower, or other resources. Further, be-
cause each department or agency views its mission requirements
as unique, only a dedicated communications-electronics system
can adequately meet these needs; therefore, forcing them to
become part of a common-user circuit would, in some way, be
forcing them to sub-optimize their decision-making or chal-
lenge their autonomy in carrying out their mission.
D. CONCLUSION
Structurally, decision-making for telecommunications is
decentralized within the Federal hierarchy. Each organiza-
tional unit within the hierarchy is free to determine whether
and how much telecommunications support is needed to carry
out its assigned mission. This includes determining whether
the use of telecommunications, hence, frequency support is
required. Further, each unit is responsible for conducting
the necessary technical studies and inter-organizational coor-
dination. The author feels that this carte blanche approach
allows a unit to justify virtually any telecommunications
support requirements without the scrutiny of higher authority.
If this authority is a disinterested party, the disinterested
party may be able to better assess alternative telecommunica-
tions support in light of existing common-user circuits thus
reducing the number of high-cost, dedicated services which
would otherwise proliferate. Each Governmental unit should
be aware of communications-electronics support policies, rules,
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and regulations. However, freedom in interpretation of poli-
cies, and regulations can be used to justify coinmunications
-
electronics decisions made by the unit. A disinterested party
should be able to more equitably implement policy, rules, and
regulations through consistent interpretation of stated policy
The role of the Federal Government in health, education,
welfare, transportation, national defense, etc., has implica-
71
tions for telecommunications. The contributions of telecom-
munications to the society at large lie principally in
improvements in the effectiveness and the efficiency of the
agencies that use telecommunications. Concomitantly, there
are federal decisions made about the depth and magnitude of
governmental interventions into the telecommunications market--
whether in the form of restrictive regulations or incentives
to promote the industry—in the inters t of telecommunications
goods and services consumers.
In a study made for the Commerce Department, the Aspen
Institue for Humanistic Studies stated that because communi-
cations-electronics related decision-making is decentralized
within the Government hierarchy, it is essential that this
decision-making be coordinated to achieve stated National
telecommunications goals. This implies that such goals do
exist. One method of coordinating diffuse decision-making
is the implementation of well-conceived policy. This policy
coordination is especially important where the subunits of an
organization are highly interdependent. The author believes
that because of the way in which decisions made by one agency
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can affect other agencies that the agencies within the Federal
hierarchy are interdependent. For example. Department of Trans-
portation plans for federal highway systems are dependent, in
part, on demographic data supplied by the Census Bureau. A
Census Bureau decision to collect data in such a way that popu-
lation trends are not revealed could adversely affect Trans-
portation Department decisions concerning where to locate new
highways. Further research is necessary to determine the
degree of interdependency
.
In researching this thesis the author was unable to find
stated National Telecommunications Policy. Telephone conver-
sations with National Telecommunications & Infoirmation Admin-
istration officials indicated that there is indeed no long
range plan yet established and that policy was contained in
the NTIA's Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal
72Radio Frequency Management . It should be noted that the
overwhelming majority of the policy set forth in the Manual
contains technical standards. For example, a Five-Year Review
Procedure for radio frequency assignments is contained on
one-half of one page and is stated in very broad terms while
bandwidth limits, emmission standards, etc., cover many pages.
Other available non-technical policy statements are of the
motherhood-and-apple-pie ilk. Further work is needed in the
area of non-technical telecommunications policy formulation.
The problem may lie with the dynamic nature of electronics
technology; the bureaucratic machinery just cannot keep abreast
of the new technologies that are coming to the fore. Indicative
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of the nature of the rapid change in electronics is the decline
in new electronics patents. Technology is moving so fast that
better devices are being developed while patent applications
are being processed, negating the value of the patent. The
problem of policy-making is manifold. For example, the dif-
ficulty in getting a group of communications-electronics
experts to agree on the state of the art in electronics and
where we want to go in the future is immense. Actually, the
question might be better stated as where we should go in the
future and what sort of societal goals should guide technology.
The social, economic, and political impacts of such a question
make it most difficult to answer, and represents another area
for future research. Further, for government to be effective
in handling the needs of its people, it is necessary to ulti-
mately coordinate the implementation of all National Policies
so that they are mutually supportive. Telecommunications can
be viewed as the link that joins the various agencies of the
Federal Government implying a degree of inter-organizational
dependence; the greater the degree of this interdependence,
the greater the need for coordination of telecommunications
policy. An area of needed study is, therefore, the determina-
tion of the degree of interdependence of the various departments
,
agencies, and organizations of the Federal hierarchy. The
interdependence may vary depending upon the type of decision
to be made and the degree of immediacy involved. One measure
of interdependence that may be used is the effect on the budget
dollars available to each department/agency because of decisions
64

that they make. For example, in the previously cited
Transportation-Census example, if the Census Bureau decides
not to provide data to the Transportation Department, Trans-
portation may have to expend funds for demographic research
or face the prospect of expending funds on unneeded highways.
/IXI a centralized telecommunications policy-making office
is to be formed, where would that office be located to influ-
ence the implementation of policy?
One way to achieve the necessary influence to promote the
implementation of policy is to place the centralized policy-
making organization in the White House. Policy statements
bearing the signature of the Nation's Chief Executive would
presumably carry more weight than those signed by a third-
echelon official such as the Assistant Secretary of Commerce,
Director, National Telecommunications & Information Administra-
tion. It is true that the President can exert coercive con-
trol over telecommunications via the Office of Management and
Budget's control of the National Budget and the 0MB 's role as
the arbiter of conflicts between the National Telecommunica-
tions & Information Administration and the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, but this is a back-door approach to the
problem. However, Richard Neustadt of the White House Domes-
tic Policy Staff has stated.
It is tempting to think you can improve policy by ^^
elevating its level; sound management demands otherwise.
He suggests that the Office of Telecommunications Policy
did not fit into the Executive Office as it had no connection
with the day-to-day work of the President, its location in
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the White House kept it so small that two-thirds of its work
was sub-contracted to the Commerce Department's Office of




soned its image and alienated its constituency.
.
."
Dr. Clay T. Whitehead, former Director of the Office of
Telecommunications Policy, remarked.
There has to be some degree of centralized planning
and management of communications in the Federal
Government. . we must centralize enough to promote
competent aggressive technical and management leader-
ship. . . coordination must be accomplished without
unduly watering down the responsibility of the basic
operating channels.
. .
What is needed in the govern-
ment is a sound planning process—one which constantly
recognizes new technology and new needs, and which
identifies basic long-range and short-range choices
that have to be made.^^
This need for planning, management, and policy-making
applies not only to communications-electronics technology,
but to all other National Policies as well. It is difficult
for the author to imagine any level of Government better
equipped than the Executive Office of the President for coor-
dinating national policies. Whether the policy to be coordi-
nated is made by the Chief Executive or the United States
Congress, a central office from which to conduct coordination
is needed.
In the area of Government operations, the Interdepartment
Radio Advisory Committee has come under fire. A criticism of
the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee comes from the
contrast between the Federal Communication Commission's open-
door mandate when supervising the spectrum used by non-
Government users and the secretive style of the Interdeparment
66

Radio Advisory Coiranittee. The Federal Communication Commis-
sion's practice of public decision-making preceeded by ample
notice, open hearings, confrontation, cross-examination, right
to counsel, recorded decisions, and impartial tribunals is in
sharp contrast to the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee's
closed hearings, lack of published rules or opinions, and dirth
of public or industry participation. This results in a bias
against non-Government users in two ways
:
1) the absence of formal screening eases the obtaining
of the assignment of frequencies for Government
users ; and
,
2) the Federal Communications Commission's willingness
to accede to Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee
requests for frequencies otherivise available for
civilian use, especially in view of the difficulty
in challenging the expertise of the Government in
7 6
National Security determinations.
A suggested method for overcoming this problem is the pooling
of all frequencies and the assignment from this pool to any
Government or non-Government users based in some way on a
free-market determination of the opportunity costs, etc.,
of the frequency assignment. Richard Neustadt has suggested
that this be done when he said.
It would make sense to unify public and private frequency
management and improve coordination with State (Depart-
ment of State) and others. "^7
I
This would involve extensive work in pricing of the spectrum
I
for the free-market, a subject for further work.
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Another criticism of the Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee-Federal Communications Commission interface is the
lack of a comparative evaluation of Government and non-Govern-
ment requests for conflicting frequency assignments. This
results in favoritism of the Government's request for fre-
quency assignments even in view of a lack of rigorous evalua-
tion of the Federal Government's request for assignment by
the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee and a lack of
evidence that Federal interests are necessarily representative
of the public's interest.
Although policy-making is not the only method of coordi-
nating the Federal Government's use of the radio frequency
spectrum, the author believes that it is a first step in
providing a framework around which to build the process of
coordination. It is a way of reducing uncertainty about what
is acceptable and how the authority overseeing implementation
of policy will react to deviations from policy. Monitoring
and control systems are important parts of coordinating, but
are beyond the scope of this thesis.




IV. FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT: THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE
This chapter explores the third level in the author's
suggested hierarchy, the National Level; Military. The pro-
cess of frequency management-assignment will be used to intro-
duce the major players in military frequency management. The
process of frequency assignment will be reviewed in two seg-
ments. First, frequency assignment in the United States &
Possessions and second, frequency assignment outside the United
States & Possessions. Frequency assignment flow charts will
be used to review the assignment process. The attributes of
the major players in the frequency management hierarchy which
directly impinge upon the Navy are summarized in Table 1. The
role of the National Telecommunications & Information Adminis-
tration was discussed in the preceding chapter and is not
recapped in Table 1. However, because of the Interdepartment
Radio Advisory Committee's role in frequency management, its
attributes are recapped in Table 1.
A. FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT: DUAL ROUTES
Figure 5 shows a complex frequency management hierarchy.
It represents the primary view of the frequency management
hierarchy held by the author. This presentation of the hier-
archy is the result of personal and telephone contact with
officials in the National Telecommunications & Information
Administration, the Navy Electromagnetic Spectrum Center, the
Commander in Chief Pacific's Communications-Electronics Director-
' ate, and official U.S. Government documents.
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For the purpose of this discussion the left-hand portion
of Figure 5 below the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Com-
munications, Command, Control, and Intelligence (ASD C &I) and
the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) is most
important. For frequency assignment inside the United States
& Possessions follows a path from the user (Army, Navy, Air
Force) to the Frequency Assignment Subcommittee (FAS) . Figure
6 gives the details of the frequency assignment process along
this route. Figure 7 shows the route to be followed for fre-
quency assignment outside the United States & Possessions.
In Figure 5 this route is from the user through the unified
commander to the Joint Frequency Panel (J/FP)
.
The author intends the connection between the Army-Navy-
Air Force units and the FAS-J/FP through the unified commander
to be indicative of the unified commander's limited ability
to assign frequencies outside the United States & Possessions
(to be discussed later) . The direct connection between the
Army-Navy-Air Force indicates that the unified commander
remains outside the assignment chain inside the United States
& Possessions. The labeling of the bottom-most blocks in
Figure 5 is designed to indicate that outside the United States
& Possessions frequency user-requesters are component commands
of the unified command, while inside the United States and
Possessions the block represents a user-requester not under
the jurisdiction of a unified command.
The next section will discuss frequency assignment in



















































1. Frequency Assignment in the United States & Possessions
Figure 6 shows that the Navy user-requester of a fre-
quency must coordinate his request with the area frequency
coordinator. An area frequency coordinator is assigned in the
vicinity of Research & Development testing activities, e.g.,
China Lake Naval Weapons Station, China Lake, California.
Their main purpose is to protect the frequencies used by the
test facility from interference by analyzing frequency assign-
ment requests to verify electromagnetic compatibility with
existing frequencies. Area frequency coordinators are usually
assigned in areas where no unified commander exists. If a
unified command does exist in the area, then the area frequency
coordinator must coordinate with the unified commander's staff
7 8
concerning frequency proposals for support of test facilities.
The area frequency coordinator also interacts with local repre-
sentatives of the Federal Aviation Administration and the
Federal Communications Commission to prevent harmful inter-
ference to or from frequencies currently authorized for use
by either of these two agencies. The user-requester chooses
his desired frequency in accordance with radio frequency propa-
gation characteristics as shown in Figure 4 and the U.S.
Government Table of Frequency Allocations. The U.S. Govern-
ment Table of Frequency Allocations is one part of the National
Table of Frequency Allocations. The National Table of Fre-
quency Allocations is composed of the U.S. Government Table
of Frequency Allocations and the Federal Commumications Com-
mission Table of Frequency Allocations. The U.S. Government
73

Table of Frequency Allocations indicates the allocation of
frequencies to telecommunications services used by the Federal
Government in the United States & Possessions. The National
Table of Frequency Allocations also indicates the degree of
compliance with International Telecommunications Union fre-
79quency allocations. International Telecommunication Union
Radio Regulations permit individual nations to allocate fre-
quencies to any desired telecommunication service for use in
that nation. This is permitted only if use of frequencies
so allocated does not interfere with users in other nations
whose use is in compliance with International Telecommunica-
80tion Union Radio Regulations . For example, the United States,
at present, conducts broadcast operations only in internation-
ally designated broadcast bands, whereas LDC'S may use non-
81broadcast frequencies for broadcast causing interference.
In addition to the area frequency coordinator, the Navy
user must coordinate with the local unified commander's fre-
quency management office. The purpose of this is inter-
Service coordination in an effort to preclude mutual interference
between military users. Navy users must also coordinate with
the local Naval Communications Station or Communications Area
Master Station to prevent interference with fleet communications
.
The area frequency coordinator's comments/recommenda-
tions are submitted to the Frequency Assignment Subcommittee
of the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee as a part of
82
the actual frequency application. The Frequency Assignment
Subcommittee then makes an assignment decision based on the
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information presented in the application, the area frequency
coordinator's comments/recommendations, and any information
presented by the Navy Electromagnetic Spectrum Center.
Two permanent groups of the Frequency Assignment
Subcommittee's substructure which make many military assign-
ments are the Aeronautical Assignment Group and the Military
Assignment Group. Aeronautical and/or Military Assignment
Group approval/disapproval of applications is tantamount to
83Frequency Assignment Subcommittee action. However, any
action lacking unanimity is referred to the Frequency Assign-
84
ment Subcommittee for its action. The Aeronautical and
Military Assignment Groups were designed to conduct their
85business without the benefit of formal meetings. Most coor-
dination is done by telephone or memorandum. However, any
86
member may request that a formal meeting be held.
The voting procedure to be used in the Interdepartment
Radio Advisory Committee and the Frequency Assignment Sub-
committee is outlined in the Manual of Regulations & Procedures
for Federal Radio Frequency Management published by the National
Telecommunications & Information Administration. These pro-
cedures include 1) majority rule in voting, 2) the ability
to file a minority opinion in the record of the committee in
the case of questions lacking unanimity, and 3) the right to
request that questions lacking in unanimity be referred to the





Once a frequency has been asigned to a Navy user, the
Navy Electromagnetic Spectrum Center acting on behalf of the
Cheif of Naval Operations authorizes that frequency for use
by the Navy requester.
2 . Frequency Assignment Outside the United States & Possessions
Spectrum management takes on added complexity in areas
outside the jurisdiction of the United States. The radio fre-
quency spectrum is considered to be a natural resource within
the boundaries of any country exercising its sovereignty; there-
fore, radio frequencies may be used only with the permission
of that country. Any deviation from established agreements
by military forces may adversely affect relations with the
host nation.
Furthermore, the sovereign rights and needs of allied
and friendly governments cannot be preempted in time of war
or conflict. The sovereign's requirements for essential com-
munications-electronics services must be protected, and this
need for protection must be considered in contingency planning.
It is true that some civilian requirements must yield in time
of war or conflict, but basic requirements for coordination
and the channels through which coordination is exercised do
not materially change from peace to war.
Spectrum management in an overseas area is under the
control of the highest command present. In all overseas com-
mands involving large geographic areas and employing Army,
Navy, and Air Force Units a unified command is established.
Major Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters in these areas
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serve as component commands. In some cases a mission requires
a force consisting of units from one service making it a speci-
fied command. An example of a unified command is Commander
in Chief Pacific, while an example of a specified command is
Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command.
If a unified command is designated, the policy guidance
is provided to this command by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Component commands are provided with policy guidance from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; however, since they are composed of
units from a single service, their internal spectrum manage-
ment conforms to that of their parent service.
Navy requests for the use of a frequency outside the
United States & Possessions are submitted to the Navy com-
ponent command, i.e.. Commander in Chief United States Pacific
Fleet (CINCPACFLT) , who may make an assignment from a pool
of frequencies or forward the request to the theatre comman-
der, i.e.. Commander in Chief Pacific (CINPAC) . The unified
commander may make an assignment if the frequency is for intra-
threatre communications-electronics requirements and all of
the following requirements are met:
1) United States national and/or international pro-
tection is not required, i.e., registered with
the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee
or the International Frequency Registration
Board.
2) Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee and
Federal Communications Commission jurisdictional
areas are not involved. This requirement may be
waived in the case of tactical and/or training
operations.
3) Appropriate coordination has been accomplished




4) Harmful interference will not result to users
whose frequencies are registered with the Inter-
department Radio Advisory Committee or the ppInternational Frequency Registration Board.
Although the above requirements may be met in making a
frequency assignment, the assignment is subject to change by
the Military Communications-Electronics Board in order to
89
make room for new military or non-military systems.
If the unified commander cannot make a frequency
assignment, the request is forwarded to the U.S. Military
Communications Electronics Board for assignment action. Fig-
ure 8 shows the structural relationship between unified com-
mands, component commands, etc., and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the U.S. Military Communications-Electronics Board.
This figure represents the flow of frequency management author-
ity for military matters worldwide.
Figure 7 shows that if the frequency is for use out-
side the United States & Possessions , the Navy must conduct
all local area coordination, i.e., coordination with the area
unified commander, host country coordination, and coordina-
tion with other U.S. Government Agencies in the area. After
this coordination is completed, the assignment request is
forwarded to the Navy Electromagnetic Spectrum for presenta-
tion to the Joint Frequency Panel (J/FP) of the U.S. Military
Communications-Electronics Board for assignment action. The
figure shows that the first step is the submission of the fre-
quency request, complete with local coordination documentation,
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cannot satisfy the request, it is forvarded to the unified
conimand for his action. Finally, if the unified command can-
not satisfy the request for assignment, it is forwarded to
the Military Communications-Electronics Board for action.
The unified commander conducts the host country
coordination that is required. This coordination is done via
one of the treaty organizations to which the United States
belongs, e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Allied
Radio Frequency Agency Permanent Staff, under the Military
Committee and the International Military Staff for Communications-
Electronics. In addition to host country coordination, the
unified commander's staff also conducts intra-theatre
coordination.
Frequency coordination with the host country is espe-
cially important in view of the way in which frequencies are
allocated by both specific telecommunication service and geo-
graphical area. For example, frequencies used for a specific
service in International Telcommunication Union Region 2
(the Americas) may cause harmful interference with the tele-
communication services of the host nation situated in another
International Telecommunication Union region. It is the policy
of the Federal Government to assign frequencies in accordance
with international agreements and International Telecommunica-
90tion Union allocations
.
If the frequency assignment request cannot be satis-
fied by the unified commander, it is forwarded to the Joint
Frequency Panel of the U.S. Military Communications-Electronics
80

Board. The overall coordination and assignment of frequencies
is done by the Joint Frequency Panel for overseas assignments.
The frequency assignment request is actually forwarded
to the Joint Frequency Panel via the Navy Electromagnetic
Spectrum Center for Navy user requests. The Joint Frequency
Panel then ascertains that the request is in compliance with
appropriate international treaties and agreements concerning
communications-electronics matters. Once all of this is done,
including coordination with other non-military U.S. Government
agencies in the host country, and the assignment is approved
by the Joint Frequency Panel, the approved assignment is
returned to the Navy Electromagnetic Spectrum Center for
authorization for use by the Navy requester. All other con-
cerned military echelons of command are notified of the
assignment at this time by separate correspondence.
Frequency assignments are registered with the Inter-
national Frequency Registration Board of the International
Telcommunication Union only if there is a requirement by the
requester to obtain international recognition of the frequency,
The registration of frequencies is made by the International
Notification Group of the Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee.
B. NAVY FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT
References have been made to the frequency management pro-
cess within the Department of the Navy. At this point some of
the details of spectrum management within the Navy will be
discussed. The major players in the Navy frequency management
81

hierarchy starting at the highest level with the Chief of
Naval Operations will be briefly described. Figure 9 shows
the organizational relationship between the players discussed
below.
1. Chief of Naval Operations
The Chief of Naval Operations is charged by the Secre-
tary of Defense with the responsibility to effect review,
coordination, and approval of applications for frequency allo-
cation/assignment submitted by activities of the Department
91
of the Navy. The Chief of Naval Operations does not actually
perform these functions, but has delegated them as shown below.
The role of the Chief of Naval Operations is similar to that
of a chief executive officer in a large corporation, i.e.,
although he may be tasked with the ultimate responsibility for
the organization, the chief executive officer may delegate
some decision-making to lower echelons.
2. Chief of Naval Operations, Director Naval Communica-
tions Division (OP-941)
The Director Naval Communications Division has been
delegated the responsibility by the Chief of Naval Operations
for promulgating overall policy guidance and direction to
the Department of the Navy in frequency management and elec-
tromagnetic compatability matters. Specifically, he is dele-
gated the responsibility for reviewing, coordinating, and
approving applications for frequency allocations. The Director
has the authority to waiver electromagnetic compatability
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the responsibility for determiing current and future require-
ments for communications-electronics equipment/systems to
accommodate Navy and Marine Corps requirements for communica-
tions-electronics support in mission accomplishment. This
last responsibility includes obtaining frequency support for
required systems. To assist the Director in his duties the
Chief of Naval Material is required by the Chief of Naval
Operations to verify that frequency allocation applications
are submitted and approved prior to obligating funds for the
development and/or procurement of communications-electronics
92
equipment. This is in keeping with national policy. An ^
approved frequency allocation authorizes the development of
telecommunication equipment for subsequent operation in the
93frequency band specified. In essence the role of the Direc-
tor Naval Communications Division is to determine requirements
and then take whatever planning and procurement actions are
necessary to meet those requirements.
3. Commander Naval Telecommunications Command
The Commander Naval Telecommunications Command is
required by the Chief of Naval Operations to provide advice
and assistance to the Chief of Naval Operations in support of
the frequency allocation process to support Navy communica-
tions-electronics requirements and the Navy's electromagnetic
compatibility program. The Commander is responsible for the
procurement of radio frequencies through coordination, allo-
cation, and assignment actions. Further, the Commander is
responsible for testing and operational use of the Navy
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Telecommunication System. Essentially the role of the Com-
mander Naval Telecommunications Command is that of senior
manager of the Naval Telecommunications System and as such
he is responsible for its operation and maintenance. This
role as manager also includes developing, maintaining, and
promulgating a manual of procedures for radio frequency
spectrum management—Naval Telecommunications Publication-6
(NTP-6)
.
4. Frequency Allocation Advisory Board (FAAB )
94
The Frequency Allocation Advisory Board was estab-
lished in 1957, to provide a forum for discussing matters
of mutual concern among Navy Department actitivies charged
with assessing electromagnetic compatability . The mission
of the FAAB is to provide the Director, Naval Communications
Division with advice and assistance concerning:
1) the procurement, allocation, assignment, and protec-
of radio frequencies required for Navy Department
use;
2) the analysis and evaluation of the Navy's electro-
magnetic compatability program;
3) the development and operation of electronic devices
to reduce electromagnetic interference; and,
4) the monitoring of the progress of the Navy Department's
implementation of the Department of Defense's Electro-




5. Navy Electromagnetic Spectrum Center (NAVENSCEN) ;
The Director, Navy Electromagnetic Spectrum Center,
who is also the Special Assistant for Frequency Management
(SAFM) under COMNAVTELCOM, is charged with numerous duties
as outlined in COMNAVTELCOM letter Serial SAFM/600 3 dated
17 M^ 1978. Essentially, the Director, NAVEMSCEN is dele-
gated the actual allocation/assignment authority for the
Department of the Navy. He is responsible for the day-to-
day procurement, protection, allocation, and assignment of
frequencies for communications-electronics equipment and sys-
tems in- the Navy. He also conducts coordination and liaison
with other Government and non-Government users of the radio
frequency spectrum. The NAVEMSCEN also provides the staff
support and representation on:
a. U.S.C.C.I.R. (International Radio Consultive Com-
mittee) National Committee;
b. Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC)
;
c. Joint Frequency Panel (J/FP) , USMCEB; and,
d. Ad hoc working groups of the IRAC.
6. Fleet Commanders in Chief (CINC'S )
The Fleet Commanders are responsible for the coordina-
tion and use of radio frequencies within the Fleets and for
coordination with unified and specified commanders, as appro-
priate. He is assisted by the local Naval Communications
Area Master Station (NAVCAMS) . Each NAVCAMS is given a spe-
cific area of responsibility as outlined in NTP-6. Further,
the Fleet Commander is required by the provisions of NTP-6
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to coordinate the use of radio frequencies by fleet units
adjacent to or within areas of responsibility of Naval District
Commandants
.
7. Naval District Commandants
Naval District Commandants are responsible for the
coordination and use of radio frequencies for Naval shore activ-
ities within the district and for coordination with unified
and specified commands in those areas located within their
area of responsibility. The only exception to this is if a
Naval Telecommunications System (NTS) activity exists in that
district. In this case the District Commandant has no responsi-
bility for the coordination of frequencies (used by the NTS
activity) with other District Activities.
8. Installation Commanders
Installation (base) commanders are responsible for the
use of radio frequencies within the confines of the instal-
lation. The use of radio frequencies by a tenant activity




One aspect of the hierarchy presented in this chapter is
the number of activities charged with the management of the
radio frequency spectrum. Each of these activities has basic-
ally the same responsibility--to coordinate the assignment
and use of radio frequencies in order to prevent electromag-
netic interference (EMI) . Yet, in a personal interview with
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the author, the Frequency Manager at the Naval Communications
Area Master Station, Eastern Pacific (NAVCAMS EASTPAC) at
Wahiawa, Hawaii, stated that about two-thirds of the high-
frequencies currently in use experience some degree of man-
made interference. The majority of this interference comes
from U.S. military sources. With so many activities engaged
in the management of the frequency spectrum, how is this
possible?
There are undoubtedly many reasons for this phenomenon.
However, the author has chosen two issues which he believes
have significant impact on this problem: 1) training and
experience (a manpower issue) and 2) the structure of the
hierarchy itself.
The first issue is the lack of experience and training
given to the personnel assigned to frequency management
billets. The Commander in Chief, Pacific's Frequency Mana-
ger (J-611) has stated.
Most assigned personnel have never had more than one
tour as a spectrum manager and for the most part that
is the one they are presently serving. ^5
Further, the Defense Audit Service says.
Present training programs are not producing the person-
nel needed to replace frequency managers that will be
lost through attrition over the next 5 to 10 years. . .
Although there is a relatively high number of military
personnel in frequency management, the attrition of
civilians will result in a reduction in total mana-
gers, both military and civilian. The loss of civilian
personnel is especially critical because of the conti-
nuity they provide in this highly technical area.^^
The author believes that there are two main implications
in this statement. First, new personnel are not being added
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to the frequency management ranks in sufficient quantity to
maintain the current level of manning. The problem stems
from the difficulty in identifying potential personnel losses
sufficiently in advance to place trainees into the frequency
management training pipe-line. This would permit filling
vacancies as they occur. Second, that despite the large
number of military frequency managers, their high turnover
rate adversely affects the continuity needed in frequency
management. This turnover in military frequency managers
seems to be designed into the system, as indicated in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Comments below.
We must expect the frequency management specialty
for officers to be subjected to the same assign-
ment criteria applied to other career areas. That
is, some frequency managers will receive their first
career duty assignment straight to the field from
the classroom. Frequency Management is a specialty
within the telecommunications career field and,
therefore, officers will move into and out of the
speciality due to the need to broaden their tele-
communications background in preparation of command
assignments. To do otherwise could severely limit
the officer's career progression. Efforts are made
to retain identification of officers trained in
frequency management so that they may be recalled
to the specialty should the need arise. A major
concern now is the high percentage of frequency
management officers in the 05/06 ranks approaching
retirement. (Author's note: there is only one 06
frequency manager in the Navy and he is retiring
in the immediate future) . We will be addressing
this problem to the Services shortly. . . .^^
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have responded to charges of
a lack of training programs made by Commander in Chief
Pacific's Frequency Manager noting that there are training
9 8programs in use for both military and civilian personnel.
A major problem is that, for example, the training course
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offered by the National Telecommunications & Information
Administration takes about six to nine months to complete.
Although this program is designed to train civilians it has
proven difficult to channel personnel into the training pro-
gram in the appropriate numbers of civilian personnel
management procedures,
. . .very few incumbent civilian DoD frequency mana-
gers have a guaranteed 6-9 months notice of retire-
ment or resignation, which requires signing a Standard
Form 52 (SF52) . In fact, a civilian is not required
to give prior notice of retirement and can submit the
SF52 the day before retirement. This obviously makes
it difficult for the Department of Defense to use
the.
. .
program for personnel replacement due to
retirement. 99
The problem then becomes one of trying to deal with the
civilian personnel management system as well as trying to
maintain a trained cadre of frequency managers
.
If the objective of the Joint Chiefs is to develope well-
rounded career telecommunications officers, this officer
rotation strategy will achieve the desired results. If,
however, the Joint Chiefs want to develop experienced mili-
tary frequency managers , this rotation strategy would appear
to be counter productive. Further the authors sees the Joint
Chiefs' statement, "
. . .so that they may be recalled to the
specialty should the need arise. . . ."as indicative of the
Joint Chiefs' view that it is easy for the former frequency
manager to reconstitute his skills and function again as a
frequency manager. The author views this statement as ignor-
ing the changing nature of frequency management techniques
(i.e., in response to the increased congestion of the spec-
trum, improvements in telecommunications equipment, etc.).
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Captain J. A. Madigan, Special Assistant for Frequency
Management, Commander, Naval Communications Command, in an
article advocating the development of professional frequency
managers, has stated that the decision makers must answer
the question of whether or not the military is planning to
respond to the electronic challenge laid down by United States
'
potential adversaries. He views this challenge as the develop-
ment of new and better communications-electronics systems.
To do this he says.
If we are to keep pace we must expend an adequate
investment in spectrum management personnel. . . .
All levels of command should come to recognize that
radio frequency spectrum management is no longer an
exercise in precise record keeping. Frequency mana-
gers are part of a highly complex professional field
where sophisticated, talented individuals compete for
space in the radio frequency spectrum, rule on new
techniques, devise procedures, resolve interference,
manage and proscribe radio frequency utilization. . . .
Like other resources, it can be polluted (harmful
interfernce) , and it is dependent upon. . . effec-
tive management for use.-^^"^
The General Accounting Office echoes Captain Madigan's concern,
. , .availability of people skilled in spectrum manage-
ment has not kept pace with increased demands and eco-
nomic and technical complexities associated with extended
use of the spectrum.-'-^
The emphasis of the above statements is that increased use
of the radio frequency spectrum demands an increase in both
the number and level of talent/skill of frequency managers.
Further, it is important that all levels of command come to
appreciate the importance of frequency management in the use
of the radio frequency spectrum. And finally, that personnel
assigned to frequency management billets should be rotated to
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other non-frequency management billets less often, thus having
more opportunity to increase their skills.
The second issue which the author will discuss is the struc-
ture of the military frequency management hierarchy. One
important aspect of the organizational structure is how autho-
. . . 102
rity to make decisions is distributed within the hierarchy.
This is an especially important issue in the case of Commander
in Chief Pacific's Frequency Manager.
Allied Communications Publication 190 U.S. Supplement-1 (B )
outlines the responsibilities of unified commanders and mili-
tary departments in frequency management. Unified commanders
are given coordination and assignment responsibility within
their geographical area of responsibility. The military
departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) are,
. . .responsible for the coordination and assignment
of radio frequencies in CONUS and for the coordination
of frequencies among civil and Government agencies
within the United States and Possessions.-'-^^
In areas under the jurisdiction of the National Telecommunica-
tions & Information Administration, military departments must
coordinate with other agencies but get frequency assignments
from the Frequency Assignment Subcommittee of the Interdepart-
ment Radio Advisory Committee.
The assignment authority of the unified commander has been
limited, as previously stated, so that he may not make assign-
ments in areas under the jurisdiction of the National Tele-
communications & Information Administration, i.e., the United
States & Possessions. In the case of the Pacific area this
puts the Commander in Chief Pacific in an untenable position
9?

with regard to frequency assignment control. On one hand the
unified commander is required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to be the ". . .final frequency coordination authority.
.
."
within the Pacific area. Hawaii falls under the jurisdiction
of the National Telecommunications & Information Administra-
tion. Service components of the Pacific command, therefore,
get their frequency assignments from the Frequency Assignment
Subcommittee vice the unified commander. The author believes
that this effectively usurps the Commander in Chief Pacific's
control over military frequency assignments within the Hawaii
10 6
area. The author has defined control as assignment autho-
rity. The author believes that this definition is in keeping
with the intent of the cited literature.
The author believes that the distribution of assignment
authority within the hierarchy places the unified commander
at a disadvantage in controlling frequency assignments within
his area of responsibility. Here control means the ability
to approve/disapprove assignments. The military department
has an avenue via the Frequency Assignment Subcommittee to
get frequency assignments which are not controlled (approved/
disapproved) by the unified commander.
The author recommends that this assignment-authority issue
be clarified in such a way that the unified commander has final
assignment authority in his geographic area of responsibility.
If the unified commander is not to be the final assignment
authority in his area of responsibility, as a" minimum , all fre-
quency applications should be forwarded to Washington via the
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unified commander's frequency manager. This would give the
unified commander an opportunity to attach comments/recommen-
dations to the application informing Washington level autho-
rity of potential problems of inappropriate assignements
,
i.e., assignments which have a high probability of causing
harmful interference.
The author believes that this is especially important in
light of the unified commander's task as assigned by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have tasked the
unified commander with the integration of multi-Service forces
107for the accomplishment of a broad continuing mission. In
the Pacific area, for example, this mission is to defend the
United States against attack in the Pacific Ocean area; to
support and advance the national policies and interests of
the United States; and carry out U.S. Military responsibilities
10 8in the Pacific Ocean area. The integration of multi-
Service forces in the accomplishment of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff's assigned mission includes the integration of the
individual component command radio frequency requirements.
The purpose of this radio frequency requirements integration
is to prevent or reduce electromagnetic interference between
communications-electronics systems. One way to achieve the
integration of frequency requirements is the assignment of
required frequencies to the component forces by a single
entity, i.e., the unified commander.
In the United States & Possessions disputes concerning
frequency assignments between the unified commander (acting
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as the defacto area frequency coordinator) and other military/
non-military Government agencies or civil entities could be
resolved via the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee
mechanism. Outside the United States & Possessions similar
disputes could be resolved via the U.S. Military Communications-
Electronics Board mechanism.
In either case, it is important that the organization of
frequency management comply with several guidelines for effec-
109tive management. First, clarity is essential. Each entity
within the organization needs to know where it belongs; where
it stands; where to go for information, decisions, and cooper-
ation; and how to get what it needs. In the case of a unified
commander such as Commander in Chief Pacific, his position of
in the control of frequency assignment/use in the Pacific
area needs clarification. If the Commander in Chief Pacific
is to be the frequency assignment/use authority in the Pacific,
then all requests for frequency assignments must, at aminimum,
be submitted to Washington via the unified commander's staff.
A better solution, in the author's opinion, is to give broader
frequency assignment authority to the unified commander.
Second, entities need to be oriented toward achieving overall
organizational results, not just toward individual efforts.
The component commands need to satisfy their frequency require-
ments, but not at the expense of mutual interference with the
unified commander's command and control frequency requirements.
Third, decisions should be made at the lowest possible level




is available. The unified commander's staff can be provided
with the necessary manpower and documentary resources to
satisfactorily conduct inter-theatre, inter-organizational,
and international coordination. Further, who is better
equipped to evaluate the communications-electronics environ-
ment in the area of the coordination efforts than personnel
on the scene of the required coordination? Adquate policy
and guidance can be provided to the unified commander so
that the politically and militarily acceptable decisions can
be made by the unified commander.
The author proposes that a military frequency management
hierarchy as shown in Figure 10 be adopted. This figure
graphically represents the proposed management, coordination,
and assignment authority chain of command worldwide for the
military. This figure shows the creation of a Department of
Defense Frequency Management Office CDoD FMO) . This office
would be the result of the colocation of the individual Ser-
vice frequency management offices in Washington. Secondly,
broader authority and responsibility would be given to the
unified commander in that any specified command or joint
task force operating in the area of responsibility of a uni-
fied commander would get frequency assignments or, at least,
frequency use authorization from the unified commander.
The author believes that this proposal will give the uni-
fied commander authority as the ultimate frequency coordination/



























Another part of this proposal by the author is the colo-
cation of the military departments' frequency management offices
(FMO'S). Currently, the Army frequency management office is
located in the Pentagon; the Air Force office is at Boiling
Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.; and the Navy frequency man-
agement office is at Cheltenham, Maryland.
The Defense Audit Service states the colocation of these
frequency management offices has several benefits aside from
the monetary savings in reduced travel costs incurred in
attending meetings. Major benefits are the elimination of
the existing separate data banks and automated data processing
facilities; reduction of message traffic for frequency manage-
ment; and consolidation of administrative functions required
in frequency management.
This colocation of the Service frequency management offices
could be utilized to provide a single Department of Defense
representative on the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Commit-
tee. The Defense Audit Service believes that this reduction
is more cost-effective in terms of personnel and would provide
a unified Department of Defense position on matters of Inter-
112department Radio Advisory Committee inters t.
Of the eighteen permanent members on the Interdepartment
Radio Advisory Committee, three are from the Department of
Defense. Although this seems to give the Department of
Defense numerical advantage in the voting procedure, the
Defense Audit Service believes that the Committee's basic
function is to provide assistance to the Director, National
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Telecommunications & Information Administration as outlined
in Table 1. The Committee and its subgroups vote on matters
brought to their attention. Unless there is unanimous agree-
ment, the matter is usually referred to the National Telecom-
113
munications & Information Administration for resolution.
The author agrees with the position of the Defense Audit
Service that under these circumstances there is no advantage
114to having a numerical advantage for the Department of Defense.
Therefore, there is no reason to maintain all three Service
representatives on the Interdepartment Radio Ad'^^isory
Committee.
The author suggests two methods for selecting the Depart-
ment of Defense representative for the Interdepartment Radio
Advisory Committee. The first is for the frequency manage-
ment offices of the Services to elect a representative from
their number to be the Department of Defense's representative
on the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee. Second,
the representative on the Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee could be chosen from the civilian staff of the
colocated frequency management offices. This second method
takes advantage of the continuity of the civilian staff as
the embodiment of the Department of Defense corporate know-
ledge and stability, i.e., lower turnover rate than the
military staffs.
The author's intent has been to demonstrate that over-
lapping areas of responsibility for frequency management-
assignment, particularly in the Pacific theatre, make the
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coordination and assignment of radio frequencies unnecessarily
difficult. These overlapping responsibilities lead to mutual
interference in frequency use. This inteference could be
reduced or prevented by allowing frequency assignment by the
area commander, i.e., the unified commander.
An important factor contributing to the interference prob-
lem is the time it takes to process a frequency assignment
request through the centralized assignment system. Informed
sources on frequency management staffs say that the processing
of assignment requests by Washington can take 60-90 days.
Meanwhile, users will utilize whatever frequency they choose
to satisfy their immediate needs while awaiting Washington's
action. Often this use will cause interference with other
users
.
The author believes that his proposal for making the uni-
fied commander the assignment authority in his geographical
area of responsibility could alleviate this problem by
1) reducing the time between request for a frequency and final
assignment from months to days, and 2) by allowing the onscene
commander who is acutely aware of the radio frequency emmission
environment in his area to make assignments.
The author also believes that making the unified Lcom-
mander the frequency assignment authority in his geographical
area of responsibility will enhance the unified commander's
knowledge of his subordinate component command's coramunications
-
electronics suites. This knowledge is important in the unified




The author's suggestion to colocate the Service frequency
management offices is not new nor is it unique. The Defense
Audit Service's report states that this colocation has been
suggested before, but has yet to be implemented. The author
believes that this colocation is being resisted because of
the Service's beliefs. Each Service believes its require-
ments are so unique that only the Service can analyze the
problem. However, the author also believes that this coloca-
tion may eventually be mandated due to budget and manpower
constraints in supporting three frequency management offices.
It, therefore, behooves the Services to make the move to
colocation and establish a system of the Service^'; choice




The Administrator, National Telecommunications & Informa-
tion Administration, Henry Geller, has pointed out that even
though technology may expand the supply of spectrum, many
115
spectrum users still perceive a shortage in the near future.
Mr. Geller has stated that this perceived scarcity has revealed
inefficiencies in United States spectrum management practice.
The author concurs with Mr. Geller in general and in particu-
lar when he says.
The spectrum, if properly conserved through sound manage-
ment, could accommodate foreseeable future needs.
Future radio frequency scarcity is an indication of the
adequacy of administrative techniques for managing the spec-
trum resource. The technical resources for enhancing spec-
trum management are improving. For example, computers can
be employed to provide rapid electromagnetic compatability
evaluation of proposed frequency allocations and assignments.
Computer software can be designed to provide alternative
choices for frequency selection. The author believes these
computer decision aids reduce the need for frequency manage-
ment personnel to have "long experience" as Admiral Boyes
suggests
,
Radio frequency management is done by experts who
meld years of experience with a curious blend of
regulations, electronics, politics and not a little
bit of larceny. They justify requirements, horse-
trade, coerce, bluff and gamble with an institution ,,_
that cannot be taught other than by long experience.
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VThile the author believes that frequency management decision
aids will reduce the need for investment in specific human capi-
tal vice on the job experience, it v/ill never eliminate it.
Rather vice education and training in communications-electronics
and data processing these personnel will be able to utilize
more complex computer based decision aids for conducting elec-
tromagnetic interference analysis and other aspects of frequency
management. This use of education and training is a more effi-
cient method of obtaining qualified personnel.
Therefore, perceived radio frequency spectrum scarcity is
amenable to administrative solution if the personnel assigned
to frequency management billets are adequated educated and
tained, have experience, and are provided with decision-making
aids.
Because spectrum scarcity is largely an administrative
problem subject to administrative solution, administrative
procedures for allocating and assigning frequencies will deter-
mine the actual number of radio frequency spectrum users . In
view of the administrative nature of the solution of spectrum
scarcity, the distinction between Government and non-Government
users appears artificial. To successfully implement an admin-
istrative solution to spectrum scarcity the notion that any
portion of the spectrum can be dedicated solely to one user
or the other must be dispelled. One of the first tasks
involved in dispelling this notion is convincing Government
and non-Government users that sharing previously dedicated
portions of the spectrum will not preclude its future use
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by either party. More than forty percent of the usable spec-
trum is currently shared by Government and non-Government
118
users. The fear of losing access to spectrum through
sharing of the spectrum with others must be overcome. The
author believes that a spectrum sharing plan will force
both Government and non-Government users to more carefully
analyze and justify frequency requirements. This plan should
also include frequency usage review procedures to return
unused frequencies to a stockpile for future reassignment.
But to adequately manage a shared spectrum, a management
system which discards the distinction between responsibilities
for Government and non-Government use of the radio frequency
spectrum must be developed. In the author's opinion, such a
system virtually demands a centralized management agency.
Knowledgeable sources see this centralized management function
residing within the Executive Office of the President. Such
a centralized system should be based upon the following
principles:
1) The agency managing the spectrum must have the
authority to carry out its management function.
This authority must include the authority to
establish and enforce sufficiently detailed tech-
nical rules governing the frequency assignment
process
.
2) A common frequency management data base and de-
cision aid must be established. This data base
and decision aid must include frequency usage
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information as well as software capable of flag-
ging potential conflicts in frequency assignments
and recommending more feasible assignments. Fre-
quency usage data would be useful to enable re-
assignment of idle frequencies.
3) Frequency review procedures to prevent under or
over utilization of portions of the spectrum.
4) Government and non-Government frequency authoriza-
tions should be based on public hearings to the
maximum extent possible consistent with National
Security.
5) Although a part of the Executive Branch, this cen-
tral body must be independent of all agencies and
would be solely responsible to the President for
overall spectrum management in the United States.
Currently, Government and non-Government users go their
own ways interacting only at the Interdepartment Radio Advi-
sory Committee and then in an adversary role, e.g., any mem-
ber of the Committee may request referral of frequency
management matters to the National Telecommunications & Infor-
mation Administration for resolution. In extreme cases, some
issues may be referred to the Office of Management and Budget
for resolution.
The ultimate problem, however, remains the development
of an adequate system to evaluate competing uses of spectrum.
It is extremely difficult to measure the opportunity costs
of frequencies used by Department of Defense agencies in a
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National defense role versus other Government or non-Government
uses. It is difficult to assess in what way many Department
of Defense spectrum uses affect National defense objectives.
Further work needs to be done in this area.
The author has attempted to present an overview of the
frequency management structure in the United States as it
relates to the Navy. The author believes this thesis pre-
sents a picture of the complexity of frequency management






Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAQ
The mission of the IRAC is to assist the Assistant Secre-
tary of Commerce for Communications and Information (Administra-
tor, National Telecommunications and Information Administration)
in the discharge of his responsibilities pertaining to the use
of the electromagnetic spectrum, as contained in Executive
Order 12046.
The basic functions of the IRAC are to:
1. assist the Assistant Secretary in assigning frequen-
cies to Federal Government radio stations;
2. assist in developing and executing policies, programs,
procedures, and technical criteria pertaining to the alloca-
tion, management, and use of the spectrum; and,
3. approve, in collaboration with the FCC, the alloca-
tion of frequency bands to radio services in the US & P
.
FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT SUBCOMMITTEE (FAS) of the IRAC
The normal function of the FAS is to assist the IRAC in
assigning frequencies to Federal Government radio stations
and in developing and executing policies, programs, procedures,
and technical criteria related to the assignment and coordi-
nation of radio frequencies and in the development and execu-
tion of procedures therefor. The FAS actually does the
assignment of frequencies for the IRAC and only irreconcilable




ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE for COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND
,
CONTROL, and INTELLIGENCE (ASD C^ &I) ;
3ASD C &I has functional responsibility for overall
policy and coordination in the area of management and use of
the radio frequency spectrum.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS )
1. Provide overall policy guidance to Services concerning
joint and inter-Service military frequency management matters.
2. Determine headquarters communications support required
<
—
for unified and specified commands and Ljrecommended'^ the assign-
ment to individual Services the responsibility for providing
that support. \
MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS BOARD (MCEB )
The mission of the MCEB is:
1. Achieve coordination on military communications-
electronics matters among DoD components , between the DoD
and other Governmental departments , and between the DoD and
representatives of foreign nations.
2
.
Provide the DoD with guidance and direction in those
functional areas of military communications-electronics for
which the MCEB is responsible.
3. Furnish advice and assistance, as requested, on
military communications-electronics matters to the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military depart-






1. is responsible for developing policy and procedures
incident to frequency engineering and management within the
DoD, with other Governmental agencies, and between the DoD
and representatives of foreign nations;
2. provides joint and inter-Service military frequency
engineering and management;
3. provides frequency engineering and management assis-
tance, as requested, to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, and other DoD
components
;
4. prepares and implements procedures for participation
in the DoD Electromagnetic Compatibility Program (EMCP)
;
5. manages the Frequency Resource Record System (FRRS)
which is designed to:
a. provide electronic data processing support to
the military departments for the reporting of frequency usage,
and
b. satisfy the requirements of DoD components for
frequency engineering and management, and supply basic data
required for performance of electromagnetic compatibility
analysis; and
6. implements radio frequency management and utilization
policy handed down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
JOINT FREQUENCY PANEL (J/FP of the MCEB )
The mission of the J/FP is to review, develop, and coor-
dinate studies, reports, DoD positions and Directions, and
recommendations of the MCEB in the area of radio frequency






The J/FP performs, among others, the following functions:
1. Develop, review, and recommend plans, policies, methods,
and procedures for frequency management;
2. Recommend operational and technical characteristics
for systems and equipments;
3. Review and recommend principles and procedures for
obtaining compatibility of systems and equipments;
4
.
Prepares recommendations for insuring coordination
of research and development with a view to reducing or pos-
sibly eliminating duplication or deficiencies in envisaged
spectrum use;
5 Prepare radio frequency guidance to DoD components
concerning the procurement and/or development of communica-
tions-electronics equipment designed purposely to radiate or
receive electromagnetic energy;
6. Coordinate with other military, Government, and foreign
military concerning communications-electronics matters; and,
7. Coordinate and assign frequencies to meet military
requirements
.
AREA FREQUENCY COORDINATOR (AFC )
1. Review and evaluated frequency assignment requests
proposed for use within their area of responsibility.
2. Provide any activity within their area of responsi-
bility technical comments concerning the probability of
harmful interference which might be caused or encountered




3. Assist, when requested, in the elimination of real-
time harmful electromagnetic interference to in-being range
and test site operations. In performing this function, the
AFC ' S are authorized to request temporary radio silence on
a frequency or band of frequencies on the part of any inter-
ferring activity for the period of time necessary to complete
the operation in progress.
4. Recommend a frequency based on an applicant's require-
ments and the technical particulars furnished by the applicant
The AFC will inform the applicant of the probability of any
harmful interference involving the proposed assignment, and
if appropriate, will recommend alternatives and/or restric-
tions to preclude such interference. The AFC ' S comments to
the applicant will be based on his records of spectrum usage
in his geographical area of responsibility and such additional
coordination with other activities in that area as he deems
appropriate. The applicant must include the AFC ' S comments
on his frequency assignment request.
5. In CONUSy AFC'S may, by mutual agreement among military
activities within their geographical area of responsibility,
arrange for time sharing and technical adjustments (emmission,
output power, etc.) of frequency assignments as required to
preclude conflicts. In areas under the jurisdiction of a
unified commander, arrangements of this type will be coordi-




6. The AFC must maintain current records of all fre-
quencies coordinated and/or assigned for use in their areas.
These records will include frequencies assigned to military
activities, military contractors, and those Government and
non-Government assignments being shared with test range
frequency assignments.
UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COf^MANDS
1. Final frequency coordination authority in their geo-
graphical area of jurisdiction.
2. Maintain records of frequencies assigned to military





1. The concept of organizational structure has many facets.
Richard H. Hall in his book Organizations; Sturcture and
Process (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977) discusses
many of the facets, but in general, structure is concerned
with the division of labor; people have different tasks
within the organization. Further, structure has to do
with ranks or a hierarchy; the positions that people fill.
These positions have rules that specify, to varying degrees,
how incumbents are to behave in their positions.
2. Hertz is the unit of measure of radio frequency. One hertz
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